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Speedy Criminal Appeal: A Right
Without A Remedy
Marc M. Arkin*
"If it were done, when 'tis done, then 'twere well it were done
quickly."1
INTRODUCTION
John Doe has been convicted after trial of one count of fel-
ony robbery, larceny, and related crimes. A state trial court
sentences him to a term of from four-and-one-half to nine
years. Because of this sentence, his probation on a prior guilty
plea is revoked and he is sentenced to an additional one to
three years in prison, to run consecutively to the first term.
Doe files notices of appeal both to the conviction and to the rev-
ocation of probation and, because he is indigent, the court as-
signs counsel to handle his appeals. Then, his case seems to
become lost in the state court system. First one attorney and
then another is relieved from the case. Counsel fails to answer
Doe's letters. The clerk's office tells counsel to resign because
another attorney has been assigned to the second appeal. Coun-
sel is relieved and then reassigned to both appeals. Extensions
are granted. Counsel resigns again. Three-and-one-half years
pass. John Doe has served more than half of his minimum sen-
tence and his appeals still have not been heard.2
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B.
Oberlin College, 1973; J.D. Yale Law School, 1982; Ph.D. Yale University, 1983.
I am grateful to Daniel Capra, Steven Duke, Bruce Green, Michael Martin,
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1. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH, act I, scene VII, lines 1-
2 (A. Reimer ed. 1980).
2. This illustration is drawn from Hampton v. Kelly, No. 88 Civ. 0528
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 1988) (LEXIS 13999, Genfed library, Dist file), summarily
dismissed on appeal, 876 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1989). The author served as ap-
pointed counsel for Mr. Hampton on appeal from the district court decision in
his petition for habeas corpus relief. The district court ordered Mr. Hampton's
release unless the New York state courts heard his direct appeal within 180
days of the issuance of the district court opinion. The New York appellate
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As speedy trial problems were the bane of the 1960s,3 so
appellate delay portends to be the issue of the 1990s. Over the
past ten years, "the volume of state criminal appeals has in-
creased at a rate far exceeding that of crimes, arrests, and tri-
als."' 4 Not surprisingly, the problems of appellate delay have
grown apace, as has concern regarding the failure of courts to
keep up with the mounting appellate load.5 In New York's
First and Second Departments, delays are so serious that pris-
oners frequently serve their sentences before their appeals are
even heard.6 Delays of six years, while "shocking," are not
"unusual."'7 Even after delay reduction procedures were insti-
tuted in Rhode Island, recent statistics show a median of more
court subsequently decided Mr. Hampton's direct appeal within the 180 day pe-
riod, reducing one count of his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor, and
leaving his sentence unchanged. Although the Second Circuit dismissed Mr.
Hampton's appeal as moot, it also discussed and agreed with the district court's
reasoning in granting the conditional release.
3. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal TriaL Rights and Remedies, 27
STAN. L. REV. 525, 525 (1975) (asserting that "mere manipulation of legal doc-
trine will not solve the problem of trial delay"); Gobold, Speedy Trial - Major
Surgery for a National Ill, 24 ALA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1972) (describing trial de-
lay as a problem of national magnitude); see also infra note 10 (listing contem-
poraneous cases and commentary concerning speedy trial right).
4. Chapper & Hansen, Managing the Criminal Appeals Process, 12
STATE CT. J., Summer 1988, at 4 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLE-
TIN, THE GROwTH OF APPEALS (Feb. 1985)).
5. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL ADVOCACY OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK, THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT APPEALS IN THE FIRST AND SECOND
DEPARTMENTS (1985); Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603,
603 (1985) (remarking that "[niew methods of recordkeeping have led to a
wealth of statistics about court processes .... [which] in turn, increased con-
cern about burgeoning litigation rates and the limits of judicial and litigants'
resources.... resulting [in] perceptions of congestion and of systemic malfunc-
tioning" (footnote omitted)); Christian, Delay in Criminal Appeals: A Func-
tional Analysis of One Court's Work, 23 STAN. L. REV. 676, 676 (1971)
(describing delay as "a growing threat to the effective administration of jus-
tice" and noting "much has been written about this problem in recent years").
Cf. ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A
CENTURY OF GROWTH 3-4 (1989) (discussing caseload overflow in federal appel-
late system); Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984?
An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 761, 761-62 (1983) (noting 400% increase in federal appeals be-
tween 1960 and 1981).
6. COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL ADVOCACY OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, supra note 5, at 1. This pattern of delay is all the more appalling be-
cause in 1984, 23% of defendants convicted at trial in the First and Second De-
partments who were represented by the Legal Aid Society on appeal gained a
reversal or other sentence modification. Id.
7. Mathis v. Hood, 851 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1988).
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than a year from the filing of a notice of appeal to decision in
criminal cases.8 Almost one quarter of the reported appeals lin-
ger more than a year and a half.9
The problem of trial delay forced itself upon the conscious-
ness of the legal community in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as
urban courts proved unable to keep up with their increasingly
heavy caseloads.10 The lower courts first struggled to articulate
a standard for measuring trial delay based on sixth amendment
norms.'1 The Supreme Court then fleshed out those norms and
developed both a standard for measuring trial delay and an ab-
solute remedy - dismissal of the indictment - once delay
crossed the constitutional barrier.12 Nevertheless, judicial ma-
nipulation of legal doctrine by itself proved ineffective in cop-
8. Chapper & Hansen, supra note 4, at 7 (chart). Chapper and Hansen
discuss the result of various procedural reforms aimed at meeting the in-
creased volume of appeals in the first-level appellate courts with a mandatory
jurisdiction. 1d. at 10; see also id. at 11 n.4 (citing several commentaries stem-
ming from this increased attention).
9. Id. at 7 (chart).
10. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-23 (1972) (noting problems
caused by delay, and citing several contemporary commentaries); Widman, The
Right to a Speedy Triar Pre-Indictment and Pre-Arrest Delay, 7 AM. CRiM.
L.Q. 248, 251 (1969) (discussing pre-arrest rights under due process); Note, The
Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 866 (1957) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Speedy Trial] (arguing for dismissal and bar of future prosecutions
for same offense as remedies for excessive delay); Comment, The Convict's
Right to a Speedy Trial, 61 J. CRIM.L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 352, 352
(1970) (noting "manifold harms" caused by delay); Note, The Lagging Right to
a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REv. 1587, 1590-91 (1965) (arguing the need for
Supreme Court ruling on the speedy trial right, given restrictive lower court
rulings and incomplete statutes).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1964)
(setting out a four factor test for determining sixth amendment speedy trial
violations), cert denied, 380 U.S. 983 (1965); United States v. Mann, 291 F.
Supp. 268, 269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (following the Simmons analysis). The sixth
amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ..... ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. E.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (noting that a
"flexible standard based on practical consideration" is appropriate to deter-
mine a claim for denial of speedy trial right, but ruling that dismissal is not an
"unsatisfactorily severe" remedy); Barker, 407 U.S. at 522 (adopting four factor
test and stating that dismissal is the only remedy for unconstitutional delay);
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321, 325 (1971) (holding that speedy trial
right does not apply prior to arrest, and ruling against dismissal when defend-
ant does not claim or prove actual prejudice); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383
(1969) (holding that the state has a duty to bring a prisoner in another jurisdic-
tion to an in-state court for trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222
(1967) (holding state practice permitting suspension of a prosecution with au-
tomatic leave to reinstate violated defendant's speedy trial right).
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ing with the delays.13
As a result, the American Bar Association proposed legisla-
tive and procedural reforms requiring that a criminal defendant
be offered a trial within a specific time period.14 This proposal
led to the passage of the federal Speedy Trial Act of 197415 and
to the adoption of similar state legislation or rules of court en-
suring that, absent permissible cause, a criminal defendant will
see trial in a set period of time.16 The result, predictably, has
been a shift from the amorphousness of constitutional litigation
to the relative certainty of legislative enforcement. The final
outcome is a more effective protection of the right to a speedy
trial.17
History appears to be repeating itself. The scenario of ap-
pellate delay is being played out in the state courts1 8 Cases in-
volving alleged violations of due process through delayed
13. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 525.
14. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved Draft 1968). See A. PAR-
TRIDGE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE I OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974
11-12 (1980) (discussing the role of the ABA's proposal in development of the
Speedy Trial Act).
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1974) (amended 1979).
16. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.3(c), at 692-94
(student ed. 1985) (discussing mechanics of various laws granting additional
time); see, e.g., New York Speedy Trial Act, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 30.10-.30
& Practice Commentary (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990) (amended in 1972 to
define the right to a speedy trial in terms of time periods). Justice Joseph Bel-
lacosa of the New York Court of Appeals, author of the practice commentary,
was then Chief Clerk of the New York Court of Appeals. Id. at p. III.
17. Within 10 years of the Supreme Court's leading decision in the area of
sixth amendment speedy trial rights, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
more than two-thirds of the states, as well as the federal government, had en-
acted legislation that set time limits on pretrial delay. R. MISNER, SPEEDY
TRIAL: FEDERAL AND STATE PRACTICE §§ 19.1-.51 (1983) (discussing each
state's statutory and case law between the Court's decision in Barker and July
1, 1982). Although the acts may be more effective than sixth amendment liti-
gation in protecting speedy trial rights, experience unfortunately has shown
that statutes hardly ensure prompt adjudication of criminal cases. Id- § 17.13,
at 303.
18. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.70 (1977) (commen-
tary); see also the following sources, which take a structural rather than a doc-
trinal approach to the problem of delay: P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M.
ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL v (1976) (presenting various structural meas-
ures to mitigate delays); J. MARTIN & E. PRESCOTT, APPELLATE COURT DELAY:
STRUCTURAL RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS OF VOLUME AND DELAY 77 (1981)
(suggesting incremental adoption of delay-reducing techniques, subject to rig-
orous evaluation); S. WASBY, T. MARVELL & A. ARKMAN, VOLUME AND DELAY
IN STATE APPELLATE COURTS: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES 5 (1979) (discussing
"reforms designed to add to or restructure appellate resources").
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appeals are making their way into the lower federal courts.1 9
Each time the dismal spectacle unfolds, three questions recur:
Is there a federal constitutional right to a speedy criminal ap-
peal? If so, what does that right look like? And, if the right is
violated, what remedies will make that right effective?
This Article considers answers to those questions. At the
outset, it is only fair to say that, although a doctrinal approach
can provide structure and - if adopted by the courts -urgency
to the public discussion of speedy appeals, it cannot break the
log jam that afflicts state appellate courts. Constitutional doc-
trine alone cannot bring about the fair and prompt handling of
criminal appeals. As Anthony Amsterdam once said, with the
right to a speedy trial in mind, "[r]ealistically considered, the
content of [constitutional] law bears the same relationship to-
ward an expeditious administration of the criminal justice ma-
chinery that man's aspiration to the stars bears toward efficient
conduct of the space program. '20 Nevertheless, to the extent
we rely on constitutional guarantees to effectuate a defendant's
interest in receiving a prompt hearing of his criminal appeal
and to articulate our aspirational goals, we should have a con-
sistent body of legal doctrine and remedies. This Article con-
cludes that, at present, we do not.
To date, the Supreme Court has not faced the question of
whether the United States Constitution guarantees a speedy
criminal appeal. The lower federal courts, however, regularly
encounter litigation arising from delayed state criminal appeals,
and almost as regularly declare that criminal defendants pos-
sess a constitutional right to a speedy criminal appeal. Unfortu-
nately, those courts have failed to consider carefully the
constitutional foundations of that right and have disagreed on
the standard by which to measure its violation. This Article ex-
amines whether present Supreme Court doctrine regarding the
application of federal constitutional guarantees to state appel-
late process supports the right to a speedy appeal in criminal
cases. After arguing that such a right is logically dictated by
19. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(granting conditional writ of habeas corpus on due process claim), aff'd, 811
F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987); United States ex, reL Hankins v. Wicker, 582 F. Supp.
180, 185 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that a 33 month delay raises a prima facie
question of due process violation), aff'd mem., 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986); Speight v. Whiddon, 516 F. Supp. 905, 909 (M.D. Ga.
1980) (granting habeas corpus relief on question of bond, partly due to alleged
due process violation).
20. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 526.
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Supreme Court decisions applying the due process and equal
protection clauses to state criminal appeals, the Article dis-
cusses the appropriate standards defining the right to a speedy
criminal appeal and the correlative remedies for its violation.
Part I considers the application of federal constitutional
provisions to state criminal appellate procedure, beginning in
1956 with the Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. Illinois,21
which held that due process and equal protection require states
to provide free trial transcripts to indigent criminal appel-
lants,22 and culminating in the Court's 1985 opinion in Evitts v.
Lucey,2 3 which held that the due process clause guarantees not
only the right to counsel on a first appeal-as-of-right, but the
right to the effective assistance of counsel.24 Supreme Court
doctrine establishes that, once in place, a first appeal-as-of-right
entails a constitutional right to an effective hearing of appellate
claims. Undue delay frustrates that right by erecting a barrier
to consideration of appellate claims, and accordingly, violates
existing constitutional norms.
Part II discusses the historical development of the right to
a speedy criminal appeal in the lower federal courts. The Arti-
cle demonstrates that the procedural posture of lawsuits alleg-
ing appellate delay has retarded analysis of the contours of the
right. Part II also considers the lower federal courts' adoption
of the sixth amendment speedy trial standard in cases involving
appellate delay, and concludes that this standard is ill-suited to
evaluating appellate delay. The inadequacy of the speedy trial
standard is largely due to its requirement that the defendant
demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay in order to estab-
lish a constitutional violation. As a practical matter, it is virtu-
ally impossible for the defendant to prove appellate prejudice
both because he already has been adjudicated guilty and be-
cause the appeal itself depends primarily on a cold record, not
on the memories of live witnesses. As a conceptual matter, the
prejudice requirement confuses factors relating to whether the
defendant's right to a prompt appeal has been violated with fac-
tors relating to the appropriate remedy for that violation.
Part III considers the remedies for a violation of the right
to a speedy criminal appeal. The Article contends that as mat-
ters now stand, the defendant's right to a speedy criminal ap-
21. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 19.
23. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
24. Id. at 396.
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peal lacks an effective remedy. Current doctrine precludes the
effective use of civil suits to remedy violations of the right to a
speedy appeal. In habeas corpus actions, use of the speedy trial
standard has created an incoherent situation: those few defend-
ants who demonstrate that delay has impaired their appeals re-
ceive that delayed appeal as a remedy for the violation.
Part IV proposes a revised standard for evaluating appel-
late delay. One problem underlying current law is that all
speedy appeal violations are treated as being of equal moment
and as meriting virtually identical remedies. Instead, Part IV
argues that courts should use the full potential of their habeas
corpus jurisdiction to fashion remedies suited to the severity of
the individual constitutional violations. To do this, courts first
must recognize the flexible remedial powers of habeas corpus;
then, they must develop a sliding scale of remedies. At the low
end of the scale, courts could grant a conditional order of re-
lease release if the defendant's appeal were not heard within a
set time. At the high end of the scale, courts might order the
immediate release of a defendant, for example, who has shown
an impaired ability to present a possibly meritorious appeal. In
between, courts could consider such remedies as release on bail
pending appeal or sentence reduction by a factor proportional
to the delay suffered by the defendant.
I. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES TO STATE CRIMINAL
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. CURRENT SUPREME COURT DocTRINE
It is axiomatic that the United States Constitution does not
require the states to afford defendants a right to appellate re-
view of criminal convictions.25 Like many axioms, however,
this particular truism is not as true as it once was. All states
presently provide defendants some form of appeal from a crimi-
nal conviction.26 Moreover, once a state provides an appeal-as-
of-right, that appeal must meet federal constitutional guaran-
25. E.g., McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) (holding that a
state need not provide appellate review as of right); see also Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974) (citing McKane for the same proposition); W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, § 18.5(c), at 703 (same).
26. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion); see Dalton,
Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 62 n.2
(1985) (noting that although Virginia and West Virginia provide exceptions,
Virginia's petition hearing is "difficult to distinguish" from full appellate re-
view, and even West Virginia grants an absolute right to petition for review).
1990"]
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tees of due process and equal protection.27
State criminal appeals were not always the subject of fed-
eral constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, Griffin v. Illinois,28 a 1956
case, marks the Supreme Court's first serious application of
federal constitutional guarantees to state criminal appellate
procedure. 29 Although a number of earlier Supreme Court
cases considered errors of constitutional magnitude in the reso-
27. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20; see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353. 356-
57 (1963) (requiring state to provide counsel for indigents' first appeal-as-of-
right).
There has been much dispute about the respective roles played by due
process and equal protection analyses in the resolution of the appeal cases.
The Court's most direct answer appears to be that "[d]ue process and equal
protection principles converge in the Court's analysis in these cases." Bearden
v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983) (citing Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17); see also Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) (observing that "[tihe precise rationale
for the Griffin and Douglas lines of cases has never been explicitly stated,
some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amend-
ment." (footnote omitted)). In a recent pronouncement on the issue, the Court
once again held that both clauses are implicated in appeals cases: due process
concerns arise when the primary question is that of fairness between the state
and the individual, regardless of how other individuals are being treated; equal
protection concerns arise when the inquiry concerns disparity in treatment by
the state of individuals whose situations are arguably indistinguishable. Evitts
v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985) (citing Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 609). At the same
time, the Court has analyzed the due process concerns as being those of "fun-
damental fairness," and the equal protection concerns as being those of "mean-
ingful access." Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987).
28. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion).
29. Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CH. L.
REV. 151, 154 (1957). Allen points out that the relatively recent application of
federal constitutional protections to state appellate procedures results from
the relatively late development of the criminal appeal itself. As Allen notes,
the criminal appeal is largely a product of the nineteenth century. Although
state court appellate procedures were in place somewhat earlier, it was not un-
til 1879 that the federal circuit courts were authorized to issue writs of error in
criminal cases. Even then, such writs were issued solely on a discretionary ba-
sis. Id. Indeed, there was no right of appeal from federal convictions until
1889, when Congress granted the right of direct review by the Supreme Court
for capital cases. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394, 400 n.9 (1957). In 1891,
Congress extended this right to include "otherwise infamous" crimes. Id.; cf. 1
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 325 (1896) (observing that Con-
gress affirmatively must grant appellate jurisdiction).
Because of this, Allen argues, there is no common law body of precedent
and practice to guide in the framing and application of constitutional standards
to the criminal appeal. Allen, supra, at 154. Moreover, the much-cited state-
ment in McKane that there is no due process right to a criminal appeal must
be judged against this background. Allen, supra, at 154-55. See McKane, 153
U.S. at 687-88. See generally Resnik, supra note 5, at 606-07 (noting Supreme
Court's steadfast refusal to recognize a constitutional right to appeal, and dis-
cussing shortcomings of resulting system).
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lution of state criminal appeals,30 few dealt specifically with de-
ficiencies in state appellate procedure. 31 Griffin involved an
indigent defendant's challenge to Illinois appellate procedures.
Although Illinois provided an appeal-as-of-right in criminal
cases, the appellant could receive full appellate review only by
supplying the appellate court with a trial transcript.32 A trial
transcript, however, was furnished free only to indigent defend-
ants sentenced to death.33 Writing for the plurality,34 Justice
Black held that due process and equal protection together re-
quired Illinois to provide a free transcript of trial court pro-
ceedings to all indigent defendants if that were essential to
"adequate and effective appellate review. '35 Noting that Illi-
nois had chosen to make an appeal an "integral part" of its trial
30. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). Affirming the defend-
ant's conviction, the Court stated that:
while the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that a State shall
provide for an appellate review in criminal cases... it is perfectly ob-
vious that where such an appeal is provided for, and the prisoner has
had the benefit of it, the proceedings in the appellate tribunal are to
be regarded as a part of the process of law under which he is held in
custody by the state.
Id. at 327 (citation omitted).
See also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 202 (1948) (reversing conviction
upheld by Arkansas Supreme Court because the state convicted the defendant
under a section of a statute different from the one charged in the information
and under which the case was submitted to the jury).
31. Notable exceptions are Dowd v. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 207 (1951), and
Cochrane v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 256 (1942). In both cases, prison rules
preventing inmates from filing petitions in court precluded prisoners incarcer-
ated in state penitentiaries from pursuing appeals of their state court convic-
tions. Dowd, 340 U.S. at 207; Cochrane, 316 U.S. at 256. In Dowd, the Supreme
Court held that rules denying some prisoners access to the courts, which might
be had by wealthier prisoners who could afford retained counsel to pursue
their appeals, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 340 U.S. at 208-09.
32. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13-15. Illinois required that the defendant provide
the appellate court with either a bill of exceptions or a trial transcript to ob-
tain full review. Id. at 13. The state conceded that it was sometimes impossi-
ble to prepare a bill of exceptions without a transcript. Id. at 14. In certain
cases raising constitutional issues, Illinois procedure provided for free tran-
scripts. Appellants in such cases, however, were unable to raise non-constitu-
tional claims. Id. at 15.
33. Id at 14.
34. Justices Black, Warren, Douglas, and Clark constituted the four vote
plurality. Id, at 13. Justice Frankfurter provided the fifth vote, concurring
separately in the judgment. IL at 20. There were also two separate dissents in
Griffin, one by Justices Burton and Minton, id. at 26-27, the other by Justice
Harlan. 1d. at 29.
35. Id. at 18, 20. The Court left open the possibility of other solutions to
the problem. Id at 20.
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system for final adjudication of the defendant's guilt or inno-
cence, 36 the Court stressed that any other result would imper-
missibly condition the right of appellate review on a
defendant's financial means.3 7
Griffin was the first in a line of cases in which the
Supreme Court, relying jointly on the due process and equal
protection clauses, struck down state appellate rules that im-
peded the initiation of appeals by indigent defendants. Many of
the cases simply applied the Griffin holding to other state rules
restricting indigent defendants' access to trial transcripts.38
The Court also extended the Griffin rationale to strike down
rules requiring indigent defendants to pay filing fees prior to
appeal.39 These "barrier" cases established that if a state of-
fered criminal defendants an appeal-as-of-right, it could not
erect wealth-based obstacles to that appeal.40 These cases also
demonstrated that once a state granted an appeal-as-of-right,
defendants had a due process right to an "adequate and effec-
36. Id at 18 (noting that "[a]ppellate review has now become an integral
part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence
of a defendant").
37. Id. at 18-19 (stating that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has").
38. See, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1971) (holding that a
state cannot deny an indigent defendant a record of sufficient completeness to
permit proper consideration of his claims because he was convicted of viola-
tions punishable only by a fine rather than by imprisonment); Draper v. Wash-
ington, 372 U.S. 487, 499-500 (1963) (invalidating state procedure providing free
transcript only to a defendant who could convince the trial judge his appeal
was not frivolous); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963) (invalidating proce-
dure whereby meaningful appeal was possible only if public defender re-
quested a transcript); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and
Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1958) (per curiam) (striking down state rule giv-
ing free transcripts only to defendants who could convince trial judge that
"justice will thereby be promoted"); see also Gardner v. California, 393 U.S.
367, 369-70 (1969) (requiring state to provide indigent prisoner with a free tran-
script of lower court habeas corpus proceeding for use in filing a new habeas
proceeding before a higher state court, even though the second application
need only contain a brief statement of prior proceedings and need not assign
error or refer to testimony in the earlier state proceeding); Long v. District
Court, 385 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1966) (per curiam) (holding that state must furnish
indigent with a free transcript of a state habeas corpus hearing for use on ap-
peal from the denial of habeas corpus even though availability of a transcript
is not a sine qua non of access to the appellate courts).
39. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959) (holding that state may not
require an indigent defendant to pay a filing fee before permitting him to ap-
peal); cf. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712-13 (1961) (extending ban on filing
fees to state habeas corpus proceedings).
40. See cases cited supra note 39.
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tive" appellate hearing.41
Seven years after Griffin, the Court moved beyond review
of barrier rules to consider what was necessary to make an ap-
peal "adequate and effective." 42 This logical extension of Grif-
fin marked the Court's first significant foray into scrutinizing
state management of criminal appeals. In Douglas v. Califor-
nia,43 the Court held that the principles enunciated in Griffin
required any state providing a criminal appeal-as-of-right to
supply an indigent defendant with counsel; without counsel, the
Court opined, the appeal would constitute nothing more than a
"meaningless ritual."44 The Douglas Court thus invalidated
California's rule, which required an appellate court finding that
an attorney would be of value either to the defendant or to the
court as a prerequisite to appointment of counsel.45 As Justice
Douglas wrote, the indigent defendant denied counsel faced a
dual handicap: first, the defendant was forced to "shift for him-
self" in preparing the appeal, and second, his ability to receive
a fair hearing was "burdened by a preliminary determination
that his case is without merit. '4 6 The Court concluded that an
appeal without a right to counsel was not the full and effective
hearing envisioned by Griffin.47
The Supreme Court focused on the defendant's due process
right to a full hearing of appellate claims as it elaborated on the
right to counsel in state criminal appeals. Primarily viewing
the issue through cases involving indigent appellants, 48 the
Court held that an attorney must assist in preparing and sub-
mitting the appellant's brief49 and must serve as an active advo-
cate, not as a mere friend of the court rendering a detached
41. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 20.
42. I&
43. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Justice Douglas wrote the opinion for a six vote
majority over the dissents of Justices Clark, Harlan, and Stewart. Id at 358-
67.
44. Id. at 358; cf Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985) (reasoning that
"[j]ust as a transcript may by rule or custom be a prerequisite to appellate re-
view, the services of a lawyer will for virtually every layman be necessary to
present an appeal in a form suitable for appellate consideration on the
merits").
45. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358.
46. Id
47. Id-
48. Rules defining when the right to counsel attaches obviously will apply
to retained and appointed counsel alike. Such cases, however, generally arise
when the defendant has appointed counsel due to indigency, rather than in sit-
uations involving defendants able to pay for retained counsel.
49. Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 259 (1967) (per curiam).
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evaluation of the appellant's claims.50 Recognizing the peculiar
difficulties associated with the defense of indigents, the Court
also established stringent requirements for permitting with-
drawal of appointed counsel.5 '
Douglas appeared to indicate the Court's willingness to fol-
low the Griffin reasoning to its logical conclusion. With its
1974 decision in Ross v. Moffitt,52 however, the Court signalled
that Griffin was not an infinitely expanding vehicle for crimi-
nal defendants' rights. In Moffitt, the Court rejected the con-
tention that the full panoply of protections found in its right to
counsel decisions applied to every state post-conviction proceed-
ing.53 The Court previously had extended Griffin to require
the provision of transcripts to indigent defendants in collateral
attacks on state convictions 54 and to strike down state filing
fees in collateral proceedings. 55 Thus, Moffitt marked a serious
retrenchment.
50. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); see also Entsminger v.
Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751 (1967); cf Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958)
(ruling that counsel in the circumstances outlined in Johnson, infra, must be
an advocate and not merely amicus curiae); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S.
565, 566 (1957) (holding that federal appellate courts must provide counsel to a
defendant challenging the trial court's certification that the appeal is not in
good faith).
51. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. In Anders, the Supreme Court noted the spe-
cial circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of counsel for an indigent de-
fendant; an indigent could not simply enter the marketplace and retain
another attorney who might believe the case had merit. Id. at 745. The Court
imposed additional procedural requirements to ensure that counsel could not
withdraw unless the case on appeal was truly lacking in merit: 1) counsel
must file, along with the request to withdraw, a brief referring to anything in
the record which might arguably support the appeal, 2) the defendant must be
furnished with a copy of the brief and be permitted to raise any additional
points, and 3) the reviewing court must, after full consideration of the lower
court proceedings and the submissions of the parties, conclude that the appeal
would be frivolous. Id. at 744. The Court reaffirmed the importance of the
Anders protections in two recent decisions, Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 350-
51 (1988), and McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 108 S. Ct. 1895, 1903-05 (1988).
Counsel, however, need not advance every argument, regardless of merit,
urged by the appellant. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983).
52. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
53. Id. at 603-11.
54. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 369-71 (1969) (requiring the provi-
sion of transcript from state habeas proceeding for use in second state habeas
proceeding); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1966) (holding that
transcript must be provided in state habeas proceeding); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 477, 485 (1963) (requiring provision of transcript in state coram nobis
proceeding).
55. Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 711-14 (1961) (invalidating filing fee for
state habeas corpus petition).
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Moffitt involved a challenge to North Carolina's tiered sys-
tem of appellate procedure in which appointed counsel was pro-
vided for indigent defendants at the first, as-of-right appeal to
the Court of Appeals, but not in subsequent discretionary ap-
peals to the North Carolina Supreme Court.56 Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that because North Caro-
lina need not provide an appeal at all, unfairness - and a con--
comitant violation of due process - could not be presumed
from North Carolina's refusal to provide counsel at every stage
of the defendant's appeal.57 On the other hand, it clearly was
crucial to the Court's decision that the defendant received
assistance of counsel in preparing his first direct appeal-as-of-
right.5 8 As the Court explained, as long as the defendant re-
ceived assistance of counsel in formulating his claims in the
first tier of review, the defendant was not "denied meaningful
access" to the second tier; the same materials prepared by coun-
sel for first tier review, supplemented by pro se submissions,
would adequately present the defendant's case for discretionary
review.59
The Moffitt majority obviously was influenced by the func-
tion of the second tier of appellate review in North Carolina.
According to the majority, the first, as-of-right, level of appel-
late review examined whether the trial resulted in a "correct
adjudication of guilt. ' 60 The second, discretionary, level of ap-
pellate review, on the other hand, had a more limited function.
It considered only cases that presented questions of significant
legal moment to the state or conflicts between an appellate
court decision and a prior North Carolina Supreme Court deci-
sion.6 1 Given this restricted role, the majority reasoned that
discretionary review was not an "integral part"62 of North Car-
olina's adjudicatory system and that, accordingly, due process
did not require North Carolina to furnish counsel during dis-
cretionary review.63 The Court's conclusion was bolstered by
56. Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 612-14.
57. Id at 611.
58. Id. at 614.
59. Id at 614-15.
60. Id. at 615 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality
opinion)).
61. Id. at 615.
62. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
63. Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 616. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall in dissent, disputed the majority's characterization of North Car-
olina's system of discretionary review, arguing that it was likely to be "the
most meaningful review the conviction will receive," and implying that it was
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the presence of appointed counsel in the as-of-right appeal so
that the submissions of counsel to the lower appellate court
could provide the basis for appellant's pro se petition to the
North Carolina Supreme Court, thereby preserving access to
the appellate process.6 4
Two years after Moffitt, a closely divided Supreme Court
in United States v. MacCollom,65 upheld a federal statute re-
quiring judicial certification that the defendant's collateral at-
tack on a federal conviction is not frivolous, and that the trial
transcript is necessary to decide the issues presented, before the
defendant is furnished with a free transcript.66 The Supreme
Court thus endorsed the very condition it already had struck
down when applied to the provision of trial transcripts in state
court direct appeals. 67 The MacCollom decision underscored
the Court's dividing line between appeals-as-of-right and discre-
tionary review.68 Furthermore, the combination of Moffitt and
MacCollom signalled the end of the Warren Court's relatively
hospitable atmosphere for criminal defendants' rights.
In 1985, however, the Supreme Court revisited the Griffin-
Douglas line of cases with its decision in Evitts v. Lucey.69 The
Evitts Court reaffirmed that the defendant must be accorded a
full and effective hearing in his first appeal-as-of-right because
that appeal is integral to the state's adjudication of guilt or in-
nocence.70 As part of the defendant's due process right to be
heard, the Court held that the Constitution guarantees, in addi-
tion to the right to appellate counsel recognized in Douglas,71
the right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel.72 As
part of the adjudicatory mechanism for guilt determination. Id at 619-20
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 614-15.
65. 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (5-4 decision).
66. Id. at 324.
67. See, e.g., Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499-500 (1963) (emphasiz-
ing that state cannot condition provision of free transcript to indigent defend-
ant on trial court ruling that appeal is non-frivolous); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477, 485 (1963) (holding that state must provide free copy of transcript to indi-
gent defendant for appeal from denial of writ of error coram nobis); Eskridge
v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958)
(per curiam) (requiring state to provide free copy of transcript to indigent de-
fendants for first direct appeal-of-right).
68. 426 U.S. at 324.
69. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
70. Id. at 403-04.
71. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
72. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, and
O'Connor made up the Evitts majority. Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger dissented. 469 U.S. at 405-11.
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the Evitts Court concluded, a defendant whose counsel does not
provide effective representation is "in no better position than
one who has no counsel at all.''73
The Court's first hurdle in Evitts was to establish, in the
face of Justice Rehnquist's somewhat quixotic dissent,74 that
the due process clause applies to state appellate procedures.
Drawing analogies to other areas of state activity, such as the
provision of welfare payments, the Evitts Court explained that
a state must comply with constitutional requirements - and
the due process clause in particular - when it opts to act in a
field involving significant discretionary elements.75 Accord-
ingly, the majority found that criminal appeals, although not
constitutionally required, must satisfy the dictates of due
process.76
After establishing that due process applies to state appeals-
as-of-right, the Court identified two critical due process inter-
ests in those appeals. 77 The first, drawn directly from Griffin,
was the defendant's right to an "adequate and effective" ap-
peal.78 This right ensures the defendant of a full and complete
hearing of his appellate claims. The second is the state's inter-
est in ensuring that only validly convicted defendants have
their freedom curtailed.79 Echoing Griffin,80 the Evitts major-
ity stated that once a state grants the defendant a right to ap-
peal, that appeal-as-of-right becomes a critical part of the state's
73. Id. at 396.
74. Id. at 408-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that
the Griffin-Douglas line of cases stood solely for the principle that equal pro-
tection precluded barriers to appeals that unduly affected the poor and main-
tained that these cases included little or no due process component. Id. at 409.
75. Id. at 401 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970)).
76. Id. Subsequently, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Court
held that the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687-701 (1984), for judging ineffectiveness of counsel at trial, also applied at the
appellate level. Smith, 477 U.S. at 536. Strickland established a two-pronged
inquiry for determining ineffectiveness. First, the defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-91. Second,
the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the de-
fense, id. at 691-96, by demonstrating that counsel's errors were so serious as
to lead to a trial whose result is unreliable. Id. at 693. At the trial level, preju-
dice is proven if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's un-
professional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Id. at 694.
77. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 400-01.
78. Id at 392 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956)).
79. Id. at 399-400.
80. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
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adjudicatory system.8 '
Implicit in the Court's finding that an appeal-as-of-right is
an integral part of the adjudicatory process is the recognition
that the trial, the first tier of adjudication, is incomplete with-
out appellate review. Although certain trial level findings -
most notably jury findings of fact - may remain beyond appel-
late review, other first tier judgments require appellate review
to achieve both legitimacy and finality.8 2 The state's decision to
grant an appeal-as-of-right reflects not only a judgment regard-
ing the accuracy of first tier outcomes but, inter alia, a judg-
ment regarding the allocation of power among
decisionmakers.8 3 Furthermore, providing defendants with ad-
ditional opportunities to present their claims increases the like-
lihood that those affected by the ultimate judicial outcome will
accept it as fair.8 4 Put another way, if no opportunity existed
for appellate review of trial findings, a state might well alter its
pretrial and trial procedure to reflect the finality of the trial
level adjudication. Granting an appeal-as-of-right reflects both
a concern for procedural fairness and for accuracy of outcome,
areas in which due process concerns are self-evident.8 5 Ade-
quate access to the appellate court - which, for the average lay
person, entails the services of competent counsel - is an intrin-
sic part of this due process concern.
Although the scope of the Evitts holding appears to be rela-
tively modest, it provoked a spirited dissent from Justice Rehn-
quist.8 6 The dissent contended that existing Supreme Court
decisions did not support the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel on appeal because that right was funda-
81. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 403-04.
82. This is true even if the state permits a defendant to waive his right to
appeal; legitimacy also is a function of consent. If the defendant freely and
publicly consents to the fairness of the judgment by waiving his appeal, the
legitimacy of the judgment can be said to be established.
83. Resnik, supra note 5, at 609-10; cf. Walker, Lind & Thibaut, The Rela-
tion Between Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1415-20
(1979) (discussing relationship between procedural fairness and accuracy of
outcome in litigant perceptions of fairness in legal dispute resolutions).
84. Cf Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983) (stating that "[w]hen
the process of direct review... comes to an end, a presumption of finality and
legality attaches to the conviction and sentence," not before).
85. I am indebted in these insights to Resnik, supra note 5, at 603-10 (dis-
cussing values protected by appeals, and various models of appellate systems);
Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 1005-30 (1984) (analyzing Supreme
Court's value judgments on merits of appeals).
86. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 406 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Bur-
ger joined in Justice Rehnquist's dissent. Id. at 405.
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mentally grounded in due process. 8 7 Rather, Justice Rehnquist
argued that the Griffin-Douglas line of cases was based wholly
on equal protection; thus, the only procedural requirement im-
posed on state criminal appeals by the federal constitution was
a bar against procedures that operated to accord indigents a
narrower scope of appellate review than non-indigents.8 8
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Evitts is rather puzzling at
first glance. It is, after all, somewhat illogical to contend that
although the equal protection clause may require states to pro-
vide counsel in an appeal-as-of-right, the Constitution has noth-
ing to say about the conduct of that attorney once appointed.
On one level, the Evitts dissent can be read as another expres-
sion of Justice Rehnquist's view that the Constitution should
not be construed to require that an indigent defendant receive
the identical procedural opportunities available to a defendant
who can afford to retain private counsel.8 9 On a more profound
level, Justice Rehnquist's dissent reflects a view that, although
the states have granted the defendant an appeal-as-of-right,
that appeal can not be regarded as - and does not become - a
constitutionally necessary part of the adjudicative process.90
87. The dissent argued that decisions "requiring that indigents be afforded
the same basic tools as those who are not indigent in appealing their criminal
convictions" and cases interpreting the "Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the
'assistance of counsel' at a criminal trial - simply are not equal to the task
they are called upon to perform." Id at 406 (emphasis in original).
88. Id at 406-07. Whatever the merits of Justice Rehnquist's argument
that all previous Supreme Court decisions reviewing state criminal appellate
procedures in the light of the federal Constitution were restricted to an equal
protection analysis, and they seem slight, the Court appears to have settled the
issue once and for all, sub silentio, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); see
also supra note 76. In that case, Justice O'Connor, without comment, applied
the sixth amendment standard of Strickland to claims of ineffectiveness of
counsel in state criminal appeals. Smith, 477 U.S. at 535.
89. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). Justice Rehnquist
continued to press this position in his dissent in Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346,
354-55 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In Penson, Justice Rehnquist more
or less conceded defeat on the issue of effective assistance of counsel on ap-
peal, but continued to argue that equal protection cannot provide the same
legal protections to an indigent that are available to a defendant able to retain
private counsel. Id at 355.
90. Justice Rehnquist is generally skeptical of the role of appeals in the
judicial process. In a speech at the 75th anniversary of the University of Flor-
ida College of Law and the dedication of Bruton-Geer Hall (Sept. 15, 1984),
Justice Rehnquist commented that "we have an obsessive concern that the re-
sult reached in a particular case be the right one." See Resnick, supra note 5,
at 605-06 (quoting Justice Rehnquist's speech). Arguing that the costs "in
terms of lawyers' time, speedy disposition and finality" are too great, he urged
that "perhaps, speaking of the federal system, the time has come to abolish ap-
peal as a matter of right from the district courts to the courts of appeals, and
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In Ewitts, Justice Rehnquist argued that the defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel derives only from the
sixth amendment and thus properly applies only to trial level
proceedings.91 At trial, the defendant needs an attorney to pro-
tect him from being unfairly stripped of the presumption of in-
nocence.92  Once convicted, the defendant has no such
constitutionally protected interest. Although Justice Rehnquist
agreed that states must provide appellate counsel to enable in-
digents to present their claims on equal footing with non-indi-
gent defendants, 93 he refused to extend to any defendant the
right of effective assistance of counsel on appeal.94 Instead,
Justice Rehnquist conjured up a parade of horribles in which
armies of justly convicted defendants challenge their state
criminal appeals in federal habeas corpus proceedings, clogging
the federal courts with review of yet another layer of state pro-
cess, and impeding state courts in enforcing their own appellate
procedures.95
The majority opinion in Evitts is nothing less than a flat re-
jection of Justice Rehnquist's position, holding, as it does, that
an appeal-as-of-right is assimilated into the process for deter-
mining guilt or innocence and becomes an integral part of that
process.96 Although Justice Rehnquist has not retreated from
his view, he apparently conceded key elements of his Evitts po-
sition in a recent case considering whether capital defendants
have a right to counsel in state collateral proceedings. Writing
for a plurality in Murray v. Giarratano,97 Justice Rehnquist ar-
gued that the additional eighth amendment safeguards at the
trial level in capital cases were sufficient to ensure the reliabil-
ity of the proceeding that imposed the death penalty. Accord-
allow such review only when it is granted in the discretion of a panel of the
appellate court." Id.
91. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 408 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 408-09 (citing Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 610-11).
93. Id. at 407.
94. Id. at 408.
95. Id. at 411.
96. See id. at 402.
97. 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist was
joined by Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia in the plurality opinion. Id. at
2767. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred separately in
the holding. Id. at 2772. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, dissented. Id. at 2773. See Millemann, Capital Post-Con-
viction Petitioners'Right o Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and
Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455, 456-57 (1989) (discussing the right
of access to the courts and procedural due process in the context of the issues
raised by Murray).
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ingly, capital defendants, like other defendants, have no right
to counsel in state collateral proceedings.98 Critical to the plu-
rality opinion - and also key to the Evitts holding - is the rec-
ognition that appeal and trial are symbiotic, so that greater
safeguards in one may allow lesser review in the other.
Perceiving that the crucial issue in Murray was the inter-
dependence of the trial and post-trial proceedings, Justice Ken-
nedy, in his concurrence, criticized the plurality's conclusion
that eighth amendment trial protections were sufficient in capi-
tal cases.99 He argued instead that "collateral relief proceed-
ings are a central part of the review process for prisoners
sentenced to death," pointing out - with the dissent - that a
substantial number of capital defendants win reversal in habeas
corpus proceedings.1 0 0 Justice Kennedy chose to analyze the
problem as one of meaningful access to the courts, and accord-
ingly declined to find that current Virginia procedures were
constitutionally infirm because no Virginia death row inmate
had been unable to obtain counsel in post-conviction proceed-
ings.10 1 Justice Stevens, in dissent, picked up Justice Kennedy's
theme of meaningful access, asserting that post-conviction pro-
cedures entail a right of access that requires particular solici-
tude on behalf of capital defendants, a solicitude the Virginia
procedures failed to demonstrate. 10 2
The entire Supreme Court thus acknowledged the interre-
latedness of trial and post-trial procedures and agreed that, if
appellate procedures are central to the state system of criminal
adjudication, due process protections apply to those procedures.
The major difference between Justice Rehnquist and the
Court's prevailing position rests in the Chief Justice's refusal to
acknowledge the constitutional effect of a state's decision to
grant an appeal-as-of-right; 103 which is to say that the appeal-
98. Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2770-72. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551
(1987), established that neither due process nor equal protection require the
state to provide appointed counsel for petitioners pursuing state collateral
post-conviction remedies. Id& at 555-59.
99. Murray, 109 S. Ct. at 2772. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
100. Id-
101. Id. at 2773. Justice Kennedy noted that the ability of Virginia death
row inmates to obtain counsel in post-conviction proceedings was due, in part,
to the fact that the state prison system itself employed lawyers to aid death
row inmates. I&L
102. Id. at 2773-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. But see Justice Rehnquist's discussion in Pennsylvania v. Finley:
[The substantive holding of Evitts - that the State may not cut off a
right to appeal because of a lawyer's ineffectiveness - depends on a
constitutional right to appointed counsel that does not exist in state
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as-of-right by its very nature becomes an integral part of the
state's adjudicatory mechanism. The next question to consider
is whether, having granted an appeal-as-of-right, the state has a
due process obligation to make that right effective by resolving
the appeal promptly.
B. DERIVING THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY APPEAL
The building blocks supporting a constitutional right to a
speedy appeal are present in current Supreme Court doctrine.
The task is to assemble them. To do so requires an argument
that goes something .like this: Once the state grants an appeal-
as-of-right in a criminal case, due process guarantees apply. 0 4
Due process includes, first and foremost, the defendant's right
to present appellate claims to the reviewing tribunal in such a
way as to receive effective review of these claims. ° 5 This right
reflects both the defendant's own interests and the state's in-
dependent interest in ensuring that only validly convicted de-
fendants are deprived of liberty.10 6
As a corollary, the state's decision to grant an appeal-as-of-
right reflects its judgment that second tier adjudications are
necessary to ensure both the correct outcome and the proce-
dural fairness of the state's first tier process. 0 7 The appeal be-
comes an integral element of the state's criminal adjudicatory
process; without it, the state's judgment lacks both finality and
legitimacy.'0 8
habeas proceedings. More important, however, is the fact that.., the
prisoner in Evitts... was actually deprived of a state-created right to
appeal....
481 U.S. 551, 558 (1987).
104. E.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 400-01 (1985) (holding that "when a
state opts to act in a field where its action has significant discretionary ele-
ments, it must nonetheless act in accord... with the Due Process Clause").
105. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (noting that "[t]here is no
meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to
defend themselves in trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an
adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay costs
in advance").
106. E.g., Evitts, 469 U.S. at 399-400 (holding that "[a] system of appeal as of
right is established precisely to assure that only those who are validly con-
victed have their freedom drastically curtailed").
107. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 609-12 (arguing that "[1]egitimacy is de-
rived from conferring decisionmaking authority over certain issues to special
subsets of decisionmakers").
108. E.g., Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (noting that "[a]ppellate review has now
become an integral part of the Illinois trial system for finally adjudicating the
guilt or innocence of a defendant"); cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887
(1983) (holding that conviction and sentence gain presumption of finality and
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As a second corollary, due process entails that a defendant
who is entitled to an effective review deserves whatever "lesser
included" rights are necessary to effectuate the right to be
heard. For example, the defendant has a right to counsel on
appeal, a right that derives jointly from due process concerns
regarding a full and fair hearing of appellate claims and equal
protection concerns regarding the relative disadvantage of indi-
gents in securing that hearing.1 0 9 The defendant's right to
counsel on appeal entails the right to effective counsel, because
anything less would render the right to appellate counsel a
nullity.110
Thus, if a state grants an appeal-as-of-right, due process re-
quires that the criminal defendant receive an opportunity to
present his claims fully to the appellate tribunal.1 11 The de-
fendant is entitled to an effective review because the appeal is
an integral phase of the state's adjudicatory system ensuring
both the accuracy and the legitimacy of the trial court judg-
ment.112 This right to receive an effective hearing must, by any
logical construction, entail the right to a timely resolution of
the defendant's appeal. Timeliness is necessary to effectuate
the right of access.11 3 Moreover, the first tier judgment re-
mains inconclusive until determination of the appeal. For ap-
pellate process to be meaningful, it must promptly correct or
vindicate first tier judgments; otherwise the purpose of an ap-
peal - correction of illegitimate judgments and the prevention
of unjust incarceration - is thwarted.
Similar interests are raised by federal habeas corpus review
of state court judgments. In this context, the Supreme Court
has, in fact, stressed the importance of timely review. For ex-
ample, in Peyton v. Rowe, 114 the Court held that prisoners in-
carcerated under consecutive sentences could challenge the
second sentence while still serving the first. 1 5 Before Peyton,
the Court allowed prisoners to challenge their second sentence
legality after direct appeal); see also Woo, The Right to a Criminal Appeal in
the People's Republic of China, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 118, 134-53 (1989) (contain-
ing an interesting discussion of the function of a criminal appeal and its per-
ceived importance in another legal system).
109. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
110. Evitts, 469 U.S. at 396.
111. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18.
112. Id.; see also Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356-57 (same).
113. Cf. Resnik, supra note 85, at 854-55 (discussing value of finality in
appeals).
114. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
115. Id. at 62-64.
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only when they began to serve it, after completing the first sen-
tence.116 The Peyton Court concluded that the rule of delay
was inimical to common sense and to the writ's purpose of
preventing unconstitutional incarceration.11 7 In doing so, the
Court found that habeas corpus statutes often contained provi-
sions requiring "prompt adjudication of the validity of the chal-
lenged restraint." 1 8 The Peyton Court reasoned that this
emphasis on prompt adjudication had two sources: First, the
frequent use of evidentiary hearings involving live testimony in
habeas corpus proceedings renders those proceedings sensitive
to delay.1 19 Second, delay extends the time prisoners entitled
to release must renain incarcerated. In this last regard, the
Court noted that if the conviction ultimately is overturned,
each day the defendant is incarcerated while his case sits in the
courts constitutes time the defendant should have enjoyed as a
free person.120 The Peyton decision indicates that any rule
should not be judged from the standpoint of individual cases -
which may raise claims unaffected by delay121 - but by the
possibility that the rule may unjustifiably increase improper
incarceration. 12 2
If timeliness is necessary to ensure that federal collateral
attack on state convictions - a proceeding in which the issues
raised are considerably more limited than in a direct state ap-
peal-as-of-right 2 3 - achieves its end of preventing unconstitu-
tional incarceration, then, a fortiori, timeliness must be
necessary to ensure that an appeal-as-of-right fulfills its pur-
pose of preventing improper decisions and unjust outcomes.
116. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1934).
117. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 64.
118. Id. at 59 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
119. Id. at 62. The Court stated that the claims frequently requiring fac-
tual determinations in live hearings include, inter alia, ineffective assistance of
counsel, coerced confessions, lack of competency to stand trial, and lack of a
fair trial. Id-
120. Id. at 64.
121. The decision overruled by Peyton, McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 140
(1934), arguably was such a case because it concerned only a facial challenge to
the indictment.
122. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 64-65.
123. It is commonplace, of course, that only federal rights are cognizable in
federal habeas corpus petitions attacking state convictions. Errors of state law
or violations of state constitutional rights may not form the basis for federal
habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1982). See Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S.
19, 22 (1975). As a practical matter, courts generally consider only depriva-
tions of federal constitutional rights on habeas. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293, 312 (1963).
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Accordingly, timeliness must be part of the due process guaran-
tees under the effectuating principle discussed earlier.1 2 4 After
all, giving the criminal defendant an appeal-as-of-right but im-
posing procedures that make it difficult for the defendant's ap-
peal to be heard is the same as giving the defendant the right to
counsel on appeal but allowing appellate counsel to provide in-
effective assistance in preparing that appeal.1 25 Both are
equivalent to no right at all.
The contrary argument is fairly straightforward and has
some rhetorical appeal: if due process does not compel a state
to grant an appeal in the first place, why should due process
require that the appeal be heard promptly? The prospect of in-
dividuals remaining incarcerated after conviction without the
prospect of appellate review does not offend due process. After
conviction, the defendant no longer benefits from the presump-
tion of innocence. Why then should due process be offended if
the state grants a right to post-conviction review which,
although not promptly administered, is evenhandedly
administered?1 2 6
This argument depends for its force on the mistaken view
that, because due process does not require states to provide
criminal appeals, state enactment of an appeal-as-of-right does
not alter the balance between the layers of adjudication in a
constitutionally significant manner. It assumes that the mecha-
nism and significance of first tier adjudication remains un-
changed even though the state grants a right to second tier
review. The Supreme Court rejected this view in Evitts when it
determined that an appeal-as-of-right becomes an integral part
of the state's adjudicative system.1 2 7 Moreover, the argument
takes an improperly straitened view of the significance of ap-
pellate process because it contains the suppressed premise that
accuracy of outcome is the primary adjudicative value. In a sys-
tem of procedural justice, however, accuracy of outcome is not
124. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
125. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 404-05 (1985).
126. This is, in effect, Justice Rehnquist's argument in his Evitts dissent.
Id at 406-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The crucial question is what rights, if
any, other than those already enumerated by the Supreme Court, does due
process require for a state court criminal appeal to pass constitutional muster?
For example, does every appellant have a right to oral argument on appeal? If
not, does every appellant have a right to submit a brief on the merits? And so
on, down the slippery slope.
127. Id at 403-04 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality
opinion)).
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the sole value. Legitimacy of outcome is equally important.128
Otherwise, devices that are frequently conducive to legitimacy
but not to accuracy, such as the exclusionary rule, would not be
part of the judicial system.129
Legitimacy in a system of procedural justice can be defined
as the result of fair procedure. 130 Under current constitutional
doctrine, if a state retains only first tier adjudication in crimi-
nal cases, such a procedure is, by definition, fair. Once a state
grants a right to second tier review of the first tier judgment,
however, the procedural outcome of the first tier standing
alone is no longer legitimate. The first tier judgment becomes
legitimate only after litigants either receive review or explicitly
waive their right to review. Indeed, the appeal's legitimating
function helps explain the legal community's discomfort with
judgments left unreviewed as a result of defense failure to com-
ply with a procedural requirement, such as the timely filing of
a notice of appeal, rather than because of a conscious client
decision.
Under due process, the right to an appeal entails the right
to an effective appeal, which in turn entails a prompt appeal.
Practices that delay or fail to speed appeals are inimical to the
purpose of appellate review.' 3 ' Delaying the second tier of re-
view casts doubt on the legitimacy of both levels of adjudica-
128. Cf Walker, Lind & Thibaut, supra note 83, at 1402-03, 1412-14 (dis-
cussing the difference between procedural justice, which entails a belief that
the techniques used for dispute resolution are fair, and distributive justice,
which entails a belief that the outcome is fair, and indicating that parties are
more likely to view an outcome as fair and satisfying when it is the result of
adversary process).
129. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence ob-
tained through unconstitutional searches or seizures is inadmissible in state
prosecutions); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that evi-
dence obtained through unconstitutional interrogation of defendants may not
be used against them in court).
130. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 711 (1984) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that constitutional guarantee of effective counsel functions
not only to reduce the chance that innocent persons are convicted but "to en-
sure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair
procedures").
131. Cf. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1968) (finding delay inimical to
the nature of habeas review). To understand this, consider the following hypo-
thetical: a state enacts an appellate rule mandating that each convicted de-
fendant has a right to a direct appeal of his conviction, but no appeal may be
heard until the defendant has served half the minimum sentence. The intui-
tive response is that such a rule is inappropriate, because the appeal only
serves its legitimating function if it promptly resolves doubts about the first
tier judgment.
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tion; the first tier because it remains open to adjustment in the
second tier, and the second tier because it has not performed its
function of resolving doubts about the first tier.132
II. THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY CRIMINAL APPEAL
A. FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT OF EXCESSIVE APPELLATE
DELAY IN STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered
whether a convicted defendant has a constitutional right to a
speedy appeal, lower federal courts regularly have entertained
claims alleging that excessive delays in state post-conviction
proceedings violated a defendant's right to due process. 33 De-
fendants initially raised excessive post-conviction delay as a
ground for excusing the exhaustion requirement in federal
habeas corpus actions. 3 4 In response, federal courts often con-
132. There also may be an argument that appellate delays implicate equal
protection guarantees because those individuals denied a prompt appeal are al-
most uniformly indigent. The factors causing appellate delays in the reported
cases are difficulties in the provision of free transcripts, the failure of ap-
pointed counsel adequately to pursue the appeal, and similar matters. Appel-
lants who can afford to pay for transcripts and who can afford to retain and
monitor their counsel by taking their business elsewhere do not face the same
lengthy delays as do indigent appellants. Moreover, the burden of such delays
is apt to be less onerous because non-indigents are more likely able to make
bond pending appeal, if the court is willing to set bail. If a wealthy individual's
criminal appeal were delayed until he had served his entire sentence, however,
his right to a speedy appeal would be violated. Therefore those lower federal
courts that recognize a right to a speedy appeal rely exclusively on the due
process clause and not on equal protection considerations.
133. See cases cited infra note 138.
134. Prisoners must demonstrate either that they have exhausted their
state judicial remedies before applying for federal collateral relief or that ex-
haustion would be futile. Exhaustion is a complicated doctrine and has been
the subject of much commentary. See D. WILKES, FEDERAL AND STATE POST-
CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 8-15, at 147 n.1 (1983). Since 1966, the ex-
haustion of state remedies requirement has been codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
& (c) (1988), which state, in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies avail-
able in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of
available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State . .. if he has the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cluded that the delay amounted to "an absence of available
State corrective process or ... circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner,"135 and
excused the defendant from exhausting state remedies. En-
couraged by this judicial reception, petitioners began to allege
that state appellate delay, in itself, was a substantive constitu-
tional violation. Although federal courts generally agreed with
that proposition in the abstract, they were uncertain how to ex-
tend their newly enunciated rule from habeas corpus actions to
these constitutional challenges.
The history of the judicial treatment of excessive delay
claims is worth considering in greater detail. As a result of a
variety of factors, state appellate caseloads became increasingly
unwieldy during the 1960s, resulting in a backlog of appeals. 136
Consequently, in the late 1960s, prisoners bringing habeas
corpus petitions in federal court began asserting that excessive
delays in state post-conviction proceedings excused them from
exhausting their state remedies. Despite the fact that exhaus-
tion is a judicially crafted doctrine based on comity and not on
due process, 137 the prisoners contended that the ineffectiveness
of state appellate process violated their due process rights.
Their aim apparently was to bolster their claim that the federal
courts should proceed directly to the merits of their habeas
corpus petitions.
The habeas exhaustion requirement mandates that prison-
ers exhaust all state court remedies, including those available
on direct appeal and on state collateral attack. Thus, the earli-
est federal cases typically involved claims of excessive delay in
state collateral attack proceedings rather than in direct ap-
peals.138  Once federal courts proved receptive to these
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988).
136. See Resnik, supra note 5, at 603-05 (examining effect that increased
caseloads have had on the development of expansive preclusion doctrines and
the increase in alternate forms of dispute resolution).
137. E.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (stressing that exhaus-
tion was a federal "policy" adopted because "'it would be unseemly in our
dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity for the state courts to correct a constitu-
tional violation'" quoting Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)); see Braden
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 490 (1973); cf Peller, In Defense of
Federal Habeas Relitigation, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 635-43 (1982) (ar-
guing that the exhaustion requirement evolved to permit the federal courts
some remedy short of outright release for lesser violations of a petitioner's
rights by allowing state courts the opportunity to correct their own errors).
138. For example, in Smith v. Kansas, 356 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 871 (1967), Smith pled guilty to state charges of burglary and
[Vol. 74:437
SPEEDY CRIMINAL APPEAL
claims,139 petitioners asserted the same challenges against ex-
cessive delays in direct state criminal appeals. 40 Again, the
lower federal courts were inclined to excuse exhaustion. In do-
ing so, however, the courts used language implying that exhaus-
tion was excused because the state appellate delays violated the
petitioners' right to due process of law.14 1
grand larceny in April, 1964. In September, 1964, Smith filed a motion under
the Kansas post-conviction statute seeking to withdraw his plea, alleging it had
been coerced. In March, 1965, the motion was denied and Smith filed a notice
of appeal. The trial court appointed the same attorney to represent Smith on
appeal. Smith objected, and the attorney moved to withdraw. In December,
1965, the Kansas court filed an order granting the attorney's motion to with-
draw and appointing new counsel. During the interim, Smith filed a federal
habeas corpus petition alleging that the delay in the Kansas post-conviction
procedure denied him due process. Id at 656.
The district court dismissed the petition on the ground that Smith had
failed to exhaust state remedies. Id The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that
exhaustion was excused and noting that the delay of more than a year in the
state post-conviction processes presented a colorable claim of unconstitutional
restraint. Id at 657. It then remanded the case to the district court with or-
ders to "take such steps as it deems necessary to secure petitioner's right to a
prompt hearing on his claim of unconstitutional restraint." Id.; see also United
States ex rel. Senk v. Brierly, 471 F.2d 657, 660 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that
three-and-one-half year delay in post-conviction proceedings was unjustifiable
and petitioner therefore would not have to exhaust his state remedies); St.
Jules v. Beto, 462 F.2d 1365, 1366 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (questioning 17-
month delay in state habeas corpus proceedings); Dixon v. Florida, 388 F.2d
424, 425 (5th Cir. 1968) (remanding case to determine if 19-month delay in
post-conviction relief was justifiable); Jones v. Crouse, 360 F.2d 157, 158 (10th
Cir. 1966) (remanding case to determine whether 18-month delay in appeal
from denial of motion for post-conviction proceedings violated defendant's due
process rights).
139. See cases cited supra note 138.
140. E.g., Way v. Crouse, 421 F.2d 145, 146-47 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam)
(questioning whether 18-month delay in docketing petitioner's appeal was jus-
tifiable); see also Odsen v. Moore, 445 F.2d 806, 806 (1st Cir. 1971) (requiring
evaluation of petitioner's claim that 34-month delay in direct appeal was un-
reasonable); Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 1970) (remanding case
for inquiry concerning 17-month delay in direct appeal). This dynamic also
may reflect a "trickling down" of the problem of delay through the levels of
state appellate review.
141. For example, the Tenth Circuit stated in Way:
Just as a delay in the adjudication of a post-conviction appeal may
work a denial of due process, so may a like delay in the determination
of a direct appeal. The question presented here is in what court
should petitioner seek vindication of his asserted constitutional griev-
ance. In our view, Way properly resorted to the federal court, which
should not, without knowing the facts and circumstances of the eight-
een month delay, have required him at this late date to commence a
completely new and independent proceeding through the very courts
which are responsible, on the face of the pleadings, for the very delay
of which he complains.
421 F.2d at 146-47; see also Shelton v. Heard, 696 F.2d 1127, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983)
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After excusing the petitioner from exhausting state reme-
dies, the federal court usually proceeded to the merits of the
habeas corpus petition.142 Even if the federal court found as a
threshold matter that the petitioner stated a colorable claim of
due process violation arising from state appellate delay, the
court did not decide whether a due process violation had oc-
curred. Instead, the district court generally decided the merits
of the petitioner's underlying claim of constitutional violation
- for example, such claims as coerced confessions or constitu-
tionally defective jury charges - without considering whether
the delay deserved any remedy other than waiving the exhaus-
tion requirement. 43 Thus, the federal courts were led to pro-
claim a due process right to a prompt appeal in sweeping
(per curiam) (reasoning that "[t]he forbearance of the federal courts is based
upon the assumption that the state remedies available to petitioner are ade-
quate and effective to vindicate federal constitutional rights. When those state
procedures become ineffective or inadequate, the foundation of the exhaustion
requirement is undercut .... " (citation omitted)).
142. If the case reached the federal appellate courts, the procedural result
normally was a remand to the district court for further proceedings. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Kansas, 356 F.2d at 655 (remanding case to district court to determine
whether one year delay between motion for relief and entry of appealable or-
der constitutes a denial of the "swift and imperative remedy" to which peti-
tioner was entitled); supra note 138 (discussing Smith).
143. See, e.g., Ralls v. Manson, 375 F. Supp. 1271, 1281-85 (D. Conn.) (reme-
dying excessive state delay by proceeding directly to the merits of petitioner's
constitutional claim), rev'd on other grounds, 503 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1974); see
also infra note 147 (discussing Ralls). This pattern also occurred in cases in
which courts considered claims of undue delay in state post-conviction pro-
ceedings other than direct appeals. For example, in United States ex reL John-
son v. Rundle, 286 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Pa. 1968), the prisoner petitioned for
federal habeas corpus relief after he had suffered a delay of 19 months in a
post-conviction proceeding following a state court conviction for rape. The dis-
trict court held that petitioner should not be required to exhaust his state rem-
edies, stating-
Of course, the theoretical premise assumes that the states will allow
the individual to present his claims without overly burdensome proce-
dural snarls and to render decisions on them with xeasonable dis-
patch. If the state does not act so, then the effect of the 'exhaustion
doctrine' would be 'to shield an invasion of the citizen's constitutional
rights.'
Id. at 767 (quoting Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597, 601 (4th Cir. 1963)).
In Johnson, the court found that the delay was "so inordinate" that it sim-
ply proceeded to hear the merits of the petitioner's case, that is, his claim not
of delay but of the introduction into evidence at trial of an involuntary confes-
sion. The court then ruled in the petitioner's favor and granted the writ. Id.
at 767-70; see also United States ex re. Lusterino v. Dros, 260 F. Supp. 13, 16-17
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (granting conditional release on the ground that petitioner's
conviction was obtained as a result of illegal seizure in violation of Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), after excusing exhaustion requirement due to delays
in coram nobis proceeding).
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language, while the fact that these issues arose in the context
of excusing the exhaustion requirement retarded serious analy-
sis of that right.
The presentation of speedy appeal rights in habeas corpus
actions also raised a problem for defendants. Although defend-
ants generally requested that federal courts proceed directly to
the merits of their habeas petitions, with rare exceptions only
federal constitutional claims are cognizable in habeas corpus. 144
Any non-constitutional appellate claims would be lost unless
the defendant could obtain review in state court. Accordingly,
prisoners had an incentive to claim that failure to hear the ap-
peal itself violated due process. Moreover, by showing that the
state's appellate delay violated due process, prisoners appar-
ently hoped to establish that they were being held in violation
of the Constitution and therefore were entitled to release.
These additional interests further confused the federal courts'
analysis of state appellate delay.
For example, in one relatively early series of cases, peti-
tioners challenged delays arising from Connecticut's criminal
appellate procedures, requesting that the federal courts con-
sider on habeas corpus the constitutional claims presented in
their much-delayed direct appeals. In the first case, Ralls v.
Manson,145 the petitioner, Ralls, had been convicted of murder
and attempted a direct appeal, arguing that various trial errors
denied him due process. While his state appeal was still pend-
ing, Ralls raised his substantive constitutional claims in a fed-
eral habeas corpus petition, contending that the federal court
should excuse exhaustion of state remedies due to excessive de-
lay in the resolution of his direct state appeal.' 46 The district
court excused exhaustion, concluding that the pattern of appel-
late delay in Connecticut courts constituted a lack of an effec-
tive state remedy against unconstitutional convictions. 47 The
144. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
145. 375 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Conn.), rev'd on other grounds, 503 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir. 1974).
146. Id. at 1274.
147. Id. at 1282-85. Connecticut appellate procedure at the time required
that both the government and the defendant file draft findings of the facts
each party offered evidence to prove, questions of law, and, in the case of rul-
ings on evidence, the specific portion of the trial transcript in which the ruling
was made. The trial court then had to file its finding, which was then subject
to correction by the parties. Only after all this could the appellant file assign-
ments of error. After filing assignments of error, the parties could proceed to
brief the case. Id. at 1279-80.
The Ralls trial court noted that although Connecticut's appellate proce-
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court then considered the three-and-one-half-year delay suf-
fered by Rails himself, finding it to be "by no means unique,"
but "clearly inordinate and excessive." 148 In effect, the court
found that exhaustion could be excused only on a showing of
both a pattern of delay that negated the possibility of effective
state process and inordinate delay in the individual petitioner's
own case.
149
The Second Circuit reversed the district court in a brief per
curiam opinion, 150 which simply concluded that Ralls' case did
not present a clear denial of constitutional rights sufficient to
justify federal intervention. 5 1 The Second Circuit flatly as-
serted that Connecticut's delay in processing Rails' direct ap-
peal did not constitute a complete absence of effective state
appellate process and therefore did not excuse Ralls' failure to
exhaust state remedies.152 Thus, the Ralls decision did not pro-
vide much guidance to district courts faced with a constitutional
challenge to state appellate delay. In concurrence, moreover,
Judge Lumbard further clouded the issue by arguing that had
Rails' guilt been open to serious question, the state's delay
would have raised sufficient due process issues to justify excus-
ing the exhaustion requirement.153
Shortly after Ralls, the Second Circuit decided Roberson v.
Connecticut.54 Roberson squarely presented the issue skirted
by Ralls: whether Connecticut appellate delays deprived the
dures theoretically provided for a final determination of a direct appeal within
about six months, the procedure worked very differently in practice. Review-
ing the 70 direct criminal appeals decided by the Connecticut Supreme Court
between 1970 and 1973, the court found that no criminal appeal had been de-
cided less than 13 months after the filing of the notice of appeal and almost
40% of the appeals were pending for more than 30 months. Id. at 1280. The
district court attributed this delay largely to the time consumed by court re-
porters in preparing trial transcripts, and to the Connecticut requirement that
defense counsel, the prosecution, and the court all draw up findings to frame
the issues for appeal. Id. at 1279-80.
148. Id. at 1282.
149. The court noted that "[w]hether the delay in the direct appeal in any
particular case has been excessive and unjustified will depend, of course, upon
the specific circumstances presented." Id. at 1279. Having found exhaustion
unnecessary, the district court then reached the constitutional claims
presented in the direct appeal, found them to be meritorious, and ordered that
the writ of habeas corpus be granted unless Connecticut gave Ralls a new trial
within 60 days. Id. at 1297-98.
150. Ralls v. Manson, 503 F.2d 491, 493 (2d Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
151. Id. at 492-93.
152. Id. at 493.
153. Id. at 494, 499 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
154. 501 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974).
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petitioner of his due process rights and merited relief in their
own regard. 155 Roberson had been convicted of heroin posses-
sion and sentenced to probation. Subsequently, he was con-
victed of robbery and, as a result, his probation was revoked.
Roberson then filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas
corpus alleging that Connecticut violated due process by revok-
ing his probation based on criminal convictions still pending on
direct appeal.15 6 The district court dismissed Roberson's peti-
tion on its merits. 5 7
Roberson next filed a second habeas corpus petition, which
repeated his claim regarding the revocation of his probation.158
Roberson raised a new claim in that petition, however, arguing
that Connecticut's excessive delay in processing his appeals -
at that point, some two years - violated his constitutional
rights.15 9 The district court sought refuge in the recent Ralls
decision and found that Roberson had failed to exhaust his
state remedies. 60
While awaiting the outcome of his Second Circuit appeal
on the exhaustion issue, Roberson returned to the Connecticut
courts and presented his claim of appellate delay. Aware of
this, the Second Circuit held that dismissal of Roberson's peti-
tion for failure to exhaust was "unduly technical."' 6' Instead,
the court recognized that Roberson might be able to establish a
claim that the state appellate delays violated his federal consti-
tutional rights.16 2 The Second Circuit therefore remanded the
case, suggesting that the district court make a "substantial" rec-
ord concerning whether the delays were "isolated occurrences
or predictable products of Connecticut appellate procedures.' 63
Apparently, the Second Circuit confused the findings rele-
vant to excusing a petitioner from the habeas exhaustion re-
quirement with the findings necessary to prove that the delay
violated the petitioner's constitutional rights. Although the for-
mer - as in Ralls - might require the showing of a pattern of
delay to indicate the total absence of effective state appellate
process, the latter simply should require a showing that the de-
155. Id at 306.
156. Id
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. I&
160. Id at 309.
161. Id
162. Id.
163. Id.
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lay was excessive in this petitioner's particular instance. For
example, if Roberson's appeal had been pending for twelve
years, it could be argued that his personal rights had been vio-
lated even if every other appeal in Connecticut had been heard
in a prompt and timely fashion. The Second Circuit apparently
overlooked this distinction and, as a result, burdened each peti-
tioner alleging unconstitutional appellate delay with proving
that the state appellate process was structurally deficient.
In a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, Judge Mansfield characterized the threshold question -
neither asked nor answered by the majority opinion - as
whether Roberson enjoyed a right to a speedy appeal in the
first place.164 Although Judge Mansfield recognized the anal-
ogy to the recently decided sixth amendment speedy trial case,
Barker v. Wingo,165 he was skeptical about the application of
speedy trial reasoning to criminal appeals. As he reflected, the
denial of a speedy appeal might not violate due process because:
the reasons advanced in favor of a speedy trial (e.g. the express terms
of the Sixth Amendment, the presumption of innocence, the risk of
loss of evidence) are not persuasive in determining whether the Con-
stitution requires an appeal to be heard within a prescribed period of
time, or indeed, at all.1 6 6
The most noteworthy aspect of Ralls and Roberson is that
the Second Circuit was able to hear and consider at least two
serious challenges to state appellate delays without deciding
whether those delays violated the Constitution, or developing a
standard for measuring the gravity of appellate delays. The
only lesson a district court might draw from the Ralls and Rob-
erson decisions was to avoid the issue entirely by insisting on
164. Id. at 310 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Mansfield took issue with the Second Circuit's decision to remand the
case, arguing that Roberson already had established a sufficient record to en-
able the federal appellate court to decide whether he was entitled to a more
prompt disposition of his appeals "than that permitted by Connecticut's proce-
dure." Id.
165. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the Court articulated a four factor bal-
ancing test for determining whether a defendant's sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial had been violated. The four factors are 1) length of the delay, 2)
the reason for the delay, 3) whether and when the defendant asserted his right
to a speedy trial, and 4) whether any actual prejudice to the defendant re-
sulted from the delay due to destruction or staleness of evidence, oppressive
pretrial incarceration, or in the creation of excessive anxiety. Id at 530. The
Court derived this standard from an analysis of the interests implicated by the
speedy trial right, and explained that no one factor was to be determinative,
but that each was to be weighed against the others. Id. at 533.
166. Roberson, 501 F.2d at 310 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
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strict compliance with the exhaustion requirement. As Rober-
son illustrates, however, even that lesson was not always
apposite.
While the Second Circuit wrestled with appellate delays in
Connecticut, other federal courts faced similar problems. 167
Although some of these federal court decisions contained broad
assertions that excessive delay violated due process, none
treated the issue with any clarity. Then, the Fifth Circuit con-
fronted the inability of Texas court reporters to keep up with
the preparation of transcripts for state criminal appeals, and
the refusal of local governments to provide adequate funding to
remedy the delays.168 Initially the Texas state courts attempted
to grapple with the problem, 169 but when state suits proved in-
167. Delays in providing transcripts necessary for the preparation of direct
appeals had caused appellate courts in the First and Tenth Circuits to find vio-
lations of due process caused by appellate delay. These decisions, however,
were every bit as nebulous as Roberson. See Rivera v. Concepcion, 469 F.2d 17,
19-20 (1st Cir. 1972) (admitting prisoners to bail pending resolution of exces-
sively delayed appeal); Tramel v. Idaho, 459 F.2d 57, 58 (10th Cir. 1972) (re-
manding for a decision whether delay in resolution of appeal amounted to a
denial of due process); cf McLallen v. Henderson, 492 F.2d 1298, 1299-1300
(8th Cir. 1974) (reviewing a suit for money damages under § 1983, alleging that
court reporter violated prisoner's civil rights by unreasonably delaying the
preparation of a transcript. The appellate court reversed the district court,
finding the reporter immune from suit due to judicial immunity, and implying,
but not deciding, that such a claim stated a cause of action under the Civil
Rights Act); Odsen v. Moore, 445 F.2d 806, 807 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding due pro-
cess violated when a state prisoner, over a period of months, complained to the
clerk of the court that his court appointed counsel was doing nothing to for-
ward his appeal and was told that all complaints of inaction must be taken up
with counsel of record).
168. Under then existing Texas criminal procedure, the necessary record
on appeal consisted of the "transcript," containing all the pleadings and other
court papers, and a "statement of facts," consisting of a transcription of the
court reporter's notes taken at the trial. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 300
n.2 (5th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
169. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals itself indicated that an exces-
sive delay in the preparation of a criminal appellant's statement of facts could
constitute a denial of due process. Colunga v. State, 527 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex.
Crim. App.) (stating that although the court did not condone delay in prepar-
ing the record, such delay did not amount to denial of due process), cert de-
nied, 421 U.S. 951 (1975); Zanders v. State, 515 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974) (stating that the delay in preparing statement of facts was not "in-
excusable" and did not deprive defendant of due process); Cunningham v.
State, 484 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (holding that delayed appeal
did not violate due process); cf. Guyton v. State, 472 S.W.2d 130, 130 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (failing to address constitutionality of delay when record did
not reach the appellate court until more than five years after trial while appel-
lant was ineligible for bail because he had received a life sentence.); Dues v.
State, 456 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (involving an appellant con-
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efficacious, litigants sought relief in the federal courts.
In 1977, John Doescher petitioned for habeas corpus, claim-
ing that excessive delay in his Texas appeal provided grounds
both for excusing exhaustion and for substantive relief.170 The
federal district court agreed that a year's delay in completing
and forwarding Doescher's record on appeal from trial to appel-
late court was excessive.171 The district court, however, found
that the Texas appellate court might yet resolve Doescher's ap-
peal promptly enough to offset this delay, and accordingly dis-
missed Doescher's petition for failure to exhaust state
remedies. 7 2 At the same time, the district court granted
Doescher leave to refile his habeas petition if the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals acted with undue delay. 73
In Doescher v. Estelle, 74 the district court attempted to
provide guidance regarding excessive appellate delay by adapt-
ing the Supreme Court standard for measuring sixth amend-
ment speedy trial violations as enunciated in Barker v.
Wingo 75 to situations involving delayed appeals. The district
court thus found that a case by case weighing of four factors de-
fined unconstitutional delay: length of delay, reason for the de-
lay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.176 Although the Doescher I court did little more
than repeat the Supreme Court's opinion in Barker v. Wingo,
Doescher I represents the first sustained attempt to inject some
structure into what previously had been a largely ad hoc
determination.
Predictably, Doescher's first petition for habeas corpus did
not end the matter. Doescher next joined with two other Texas
prisoners to file suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,1 7 claiming
that the excessive delays in preparation of their trial transcripts
deprived them of due process.'7 8 After the Texas Court of
fined to jail for three and one-half years from the end of his trial until the
record reached the appellate court, which then reversed his conviction).
170. Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943, 945 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (Doescher
I), appeal dismissed as moot, 597 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1979).
171. Id. at 952.
172. Id. at 953.
173. Id.
174. 454 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (Doescher I), appeal dismissed as
moot, 597 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1979).
175. 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972); see supra note 165.
176. Doescher I, 454 F. Supp. at 947.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see infra note 248 (reprinting text of statute).
178. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 931 (1981).
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Criminal Appeals unfavorably decided his appeal, Doescher re-
filed his individual petition for federal habeas corpus, again al-
leging appellate delay and other constitutional violations as
grounds for relief. 79 Both cases were heard by the same dis-
trict court that had decided Doescher's first petition for habeas
corpus. The court issued two interdependent opinions in the
cases, the more detailed one in Rheuark v. Shaw, the Section
1983 case.' 8 0 In Rheuark, the court unequivocally held that de-
lays of nine, twenty, and twenty-three months in preparing
trial transcripts violated due process and the "constitutional
commitment to speedy justice for all."' 8' Although the district
court repeated its adherence to the Barker standard for mea-
suring delays, it made little use of Barker and avoided alto-
gether any discussion of the Barker element of prejudice 8 2
The federal district court's disposition of Doescher's re-
newed petition for habeas corpus relief relied heavily on its de-
cision in Rheuark, and accordingly was framed largely in
conclusory terms. In the habeas action, however, the federal
district court explicitly found that prejudice was not a neces-
sary element to prove a due process violation. 8 3 Nevertheless,
the court found that Doescher's incarceration while awaiting
the determination of his appeal showed he had been prejudiced
by the unconstitutional delay. 8 4
Both sides appealed the unfavorable elements of the
Rheuark decision to the Fifth Circuit, which utilized the case as
a vehicle for a major statement regarding appellate delay. The
Fifth Circuit announced that "any substantial retardation" of
the appellate process can violate due process, including exces-
sive delay in furnishing a transcript of testimony necessary to
complete the appellate record.8 5 The court also proclaimed
that the Supreme Court's approach in Barker v. Wingo was an
"appealing" standard for determining whether appellate delay
179. Doescher v. Estelle, 477 F. Supp. 932, 933 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (Doescher
/H), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980).
180. 477 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 628
F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981).
181. Id. at 910.
182. I at 908-10. Rather, the opinion largely was taken up with a discus-
sion of the possible remedies for the violation.
183. Doescher I, 477 F. Supp. at 934 (citing Doescher I, 454 F. Supp. at 950-
51).
184. Id. at 934 n.1.
185. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 931 (1981).
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reached constitutional proportions.186
Echoing the district court's original opinion in Doescher
1,187 the Fifth Circuit explained that Barker entailed an ad hoc
weighing of four factors: the length of the delay, the reason be-
hind the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and the
prejudice to the defendant. 8 8 Recognizing that the most prob-
lematic factor was prejudice, the court attempted to adapt
speedy trial prejudice to speedy appeal prejudice. The Fifth
Circuit stated that, for sixth amendment purposes, prejudice
was evaluated in light of the interests the speedy trial right was
designed to protect: the prevention of oppressive pretrial incar-
ceration, the minimization of anxiety and concern of the ac-
cused, and limitation of the possibility that the accused's
defense might be impaired.18 9 Translating this catalogue of in-
terests into the appellate context, the Fifth Circuit suggested
that prejudice be measured in light of the interests in prevent-
ing oppressive incarceration pending appeal: minimizing anxi-
ety and concern pending the outcome of the appeal and limiting
the possible impairment of a convicted defendant's grounds for
appeal, as well as his ability to mount a defense in the event of
a reversal.19 0
Unfortunately, the Barker standard lost something in the
186. Id. at 303.
187. Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (Doescher I),
appeal dismissed as moot, 597 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1979).
188. Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530
(1972)).
189. Id.
190. Id. As an example of prejudice, the Fifth Circuit mentioned that court
reporters have more difficulty transcribing older shorthand notes and there-
fore are apt to make more mistakes in transcribing stale notes, possibly im-
pairing grounds for appeal in the process. Id.
In relying on the Barker speedy trial standard, the Fifth Circuit expressly
declined to apply the rule set forth in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783
(1977), a case dealing with pre-indictment delay. In Lovasco, the Supreme
Court found that the due process clause played a limited role in protecting de-
fendants against oppressive delay, preferring to rely on legislatively enacted
statutes of limitation to provide limits on pre-indictment delay. Id. at 788-89
(citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322-24 (1971)). As the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted, no such legislative limits exist in the case of appellate delays.
Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303 n.9. Moreover, the court pointed out that the reasons
for constraining appellate delay are similar to those constraining pretrial de-
lay: defendants generally are incarcerated pending the outcome of appeal. Id.
at 303. If the appeal is not frivolous, a defendant may receive punishment
when he has not been properly proven guilty. Conversely, if the defendant is
released on bail pending appeal, the court argued that the guilty may be walk-
ing the streets free to commit other crimes. Id. at 304 (citing Reese v. State,
481 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).
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translation. On one level, the Fifth Circuit failed to perceive
that the thrust of Barker was directed at distinguishing delay
helpful to and possibly encouraged by the defendant from delay
that actually harmed him. Having committed itself to the
structure of the Barker standard, the Fifth Circuit also failed to
recognize the more immediate differences between the appel-
late and trial context. For example, the Fifth Circuit's discus-
sion in Rheuark did not consider that, because the appeal relies
on a cold record and not on live witnesses, the defendant might
have more difficulty proving impairment of his ability to pres-
ent his appeal than impairment of his ability to mount a de-
fense at trial. The court also did not appreciate the differences
between pretrial and post-conviction incarceration. Further-
more, the Rheuark court did not even refer to Barker's specific
insistence that none of its four factors be deemed necessary to
establish a due process violation, a point scrupulously observed
by the district court in the Doescher cases.19 1 These failures
sowed the seeds of future difficulties.
B. THE INADEQUACY OF THE BARKER V. WINGO STANDARD
The analogy between the speedy trial right and the speedy
appeal right is a seductive one. At first glance, the two rights
appear to involve the same interests and have a similar ration-
ale.192 Delay, however, has a different significance at the trial
level than at the appellate level. At the trial level, delay is a
double-edged sword; defendants can as readily profit from delay
as be harmed by it. Witnesses whose memories have been
dulled by time, for example, may hamper the prosecution in es-
tablishing its case, just as they may impair a defendant's ability
to present his defense. As a result, a defendant may seek to de-
lay his trial in order to take advantage of the hoped-for
favorable effects of delay. The Barker factors explicitly reflect
the Supreme Court's recognition of this difficulty and its con-
cern for distinguishing delay that benefits the defendant and
which is courted by him from delay that harms him; the Court
191. Doescher I, 454 F. Supp. at 950 (stating that the court need not find
actual prejudice to find a denial of due process); Doescher II, 477 F. Supp. at
934 (same).
192. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 303 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that
defendants have similar interests in obtaining both speedy trials and prompt
appeals), cert denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d
1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that "'the right to avoid unreasonable delay
in the appellate process is similar to the right to a speedy trial,"' quoting De-
Lancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 1984)).
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
permits the finding of a constitutional violation only if delay ac-
tually harms the defendant.193
Conversely, appellate delay is not beneficial to the criminal
defendant. Certainly, it does not increase the likelihood that he
will secure a favorable outcome.194 In fact, appellate delay is al-
ways harmful to the defendant to the extent that it postpones
finality of judgment and increases the likelihood of unjust in-
carceration. Barker - and any other conceivable speedy trial
standard - must focus on sorting beneficial from harmful trial
delay, entailing issues neither appropriate nor necessary in the
appellate context.
Largely because of this fundamental disjunction, applica-
tion of the Barker speedy trial standard to appellate delay cre-
ates as many difficulties as it solves. On the one hand, Barker
preserves all the uncertainties of a standard based solely on an
ad hoc consideration of the length of the delay. On the other
hand, Barker injects problematic factors into the calculus that
determines whether state appellate delay rises to the level of a
constitutional violation. Furthermore, courts have tended to
apply Barker mechanically, establishing an emphasis on preju-
dice as the key element of the constitutional violation.
Although prejudice is not essential to a violation of the Barker
speedy trial standard itself,195 this insistence on a prejudice re-
quirement in the appellate context has led to a great deal of an-
alytical and practical confusion in assessing unconstitutional
appellate delay.
In order to determine whether a delay has violated a de-
fendant's constitutional rights, Barker advises a case-by-case
balancing of four factors: 1) length of delay, 2) the reason for
the delay, 3) defendant's assertion of his constitutional right,
and 4) prejudice to the defendant arising from the delay. On its
face, this standard appears to lend a fair amount of structure to
a court's deliberations; in reality, that structure is largely illu-
sory. For example, in evaluating the gravity of the length of
appellate delay, courts face essentially the same determination
as if they were making an unguided ad hoc decision, because
193. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972).
194. It could be argued that the defendant might benefit during the delay
by favorable developments in the law or a change in the composition of the
appellate court, rendering it more receptive to the appellant's claims. Both of
these arguments are so speculative that they cannot be properly cognizable by
the courts.
195. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533 (stating that "[iun sum, these [four] factors
have no talismanic qualities").
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Barker does not provide a benchmark for measuring delay.
Rather, lower federal courts must rely on their own innate
sense of fairness, an attribute they presumably possessed prior
to the adoption of Barker.
Courts already have begun to chafe at the inadequacy of
Barker for evaluating the constitutional import of the length of
appellate delay.196 One frustrated court, applying the Barker
standard, suggested a rule of thumb that a delay of one-half of
a convicted defendant's minimum sentence would amount to a
constitutional violation.197 This approach, however, favors pris-
oners with short sentences while penalizing those with longer
sentences, even if their appeals are simpler or more meritori-
ous. Moreover, once delay reaches fifty percent of the mini-
mum sentence, the other Barker considerations become
irrelevant because the court automatically must find a constitu-
tional violation. Noting the shortcomings of the fifty percent
approach, another court suggested that the reasonableness of
the length of delay should be viewed as a function of the com-
plexity of the litigation, the parties' behavior, and the court's
activity in monitoring its calendar. Although this suggestion
avoids some of the pitfalls of the fifty percent rule, it asks
courts to weigh two of the remaining three Barker factors -
the reasons for the delay and the petitioner's assertion of the
right - twice.198 Neither alternative is particularly helpful;
both point out Barker's deficiencies when applied to appellate
delay.
Inclusion of Barker's "demand rule" in the appellate con-
text is equally unhelpful, although in a different way. The de-
mand rule apparently originated in speedy trial cases to ensure
196. E.g., Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (apply-
ing Barker, but noting "[t]here is no formula for determining if a delay is ex-
cessive"), aff'd, 811 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1987).
197. Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
"[w]here the delay between conviction and the hearing of an appeal exceeds 50
percent of a petitioner's ten year minimum sentence, the court can assume
that the delay is prejudicial"); cf. Shelton v. Heard, 696 F.2d 1127, 1129 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam) (asserting that a delay of one-half of a prisoner's sentence is
sufficient to excuse exhaustion), on sua sponte reconsideration, 696 F.2d 1127
(per curiam), on further sua sponte reconsideration, 707 F.2d 200 (1983) (per
curiam); Guam v. Olsen, 462 F. Supp. 608, 613 (D. Guam App. Div. 1978) (hold-
ing two-year delay in preparation of transcript prejudicial per se, entitling de-
fendant to outright release).
198. See Wheeler, 639 F. Supp. at 1378-79 (citing Cousart v. Hammock, 745
F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 1984), for the proposition that length of sentence is a fac-
tor in deciding whether a delay is excessive, but arguing that the length of sen-
tence should not be dispositive).
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that a defendant requested a speedy trial while the court was
still able to give him one.199 One would assume, therefore, that
the demand rule should perform a similar role in the context of
delayed appeals; that is, to act as a device to ensure that the de-
fendant resorted to effective means of expediting the appeal to
avoid possible abridgement of the right to a speedy appeal. The
exhaustion requirement in habeas corpus, however, effectively
performs this screening function in cases involving appellate
delay. Accordingly, the demand rule is largely redundant when
applied to delayed appeals. Even if the demand rule were not
redundant, it is incoherent to transform a device for avoiding
unnecessary violations into a factor for determining whether a
violation actually occurred. If excessive delay impaired the de-
fendant's ability to present his appeal - as through the loss of
the trial transcript, for example - it is nonsensical to say that
the defendant's claim of a constitutional violation depends on
whether he demanded a speedier appeal or not. To argue that a
defendant implicitly may waive his right to a fair appeal-as-of-
right, or to a remedy for the violation of that right, by failing to
demand a speedier appeal, is unattractive at best.200
Similar criticisms may be made concerning the inclusion of
the parties' conduct as a factor in determining whether delay
reaches the level of a constitutional violation. Consideration of
the defendant's conduct essentially imposes a second demand
rule, ensuring that the defendant has not slept on his rights.201
Laches, however, is an equitable defense, not an element of the
defendant's claim. Requiring the petitioner to prove he has not
199. Note, Speedy Trial, supra note 10, at 853 (noting courts reasoned that
the demand doctrine would "lead to a trial on the merits and not to a technical
evasion of the charge").
200. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 540-41 (stating that waiver of right to
a speedy trial due to defendants' failure to demand a speedier trial places de-
fendants "in the unconscionable position of having to choose between insisting
on a speedy trial and gambling on the incalculable possibilities of speedy trial
dismissal").
201. The requirement is less problematic if the delay is caused by the de-
fendant. Such cases appear to be rare, evidencing that delay on appeal is not
beneficial to defendants. Rather, courts interpret the rule to see whether the
defendant insisted on his rights. It should be noted that failure of appointed
defense counsel to pursue an appeal in a prompt manner is attributable to the
state, not to the defendant, as long as the defendant made reasonable efforts to
prod counsel. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1378 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that "the failure to correct deficiencies of assigned counsel con-
stitutes state action"); Harris, 601 F. Supp. at 992 (reasoning that "ineffective
assistance of counsel and failure of the state to correct the deficiency consti-
tute state action").
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slept on his rights is rather like making the plaintiff in equity
disprove a defense as part of his case in chief.
As to the government's conduct, certain delays are so long
or so prejudicial that every averment of governmental good
faith is irrelevant. More troubling, however, is the tendency of
courts to transform the factor of government conduct into a re-
quirement that the defendant demonstrate governmental bad
faith or bad motive.20 2 Although governmental bad faith in de-
laying an appeal may sufficiently delineate a constitutional vio-
lation, it should hardly be a necessary element of the
petitioner's claim.20 3 An inadvertent delay can be as serious as
an intentional one.
By far the most problematic aspect of the Barker standard
is the inclusion of prejudice as an element of the constitutional
violation. Whatever may be meant by prejudice in the appel-
late context, the Barker factors do not adequately measure it.
The more important point, however, is that prejudice is not
necessary to show a constitutionally cognizable violation of a
procedural right that focuses on access to the judicial system.
Prejudice may be relevant to the court's selection of a remedy;
it is not requisite to finding a constitutional violation.
Because appellate delay does not benefit the defendant, the
emphasis on a finding of prejudice is misplaced. Prejudice, as
drawn from Barker, is a factor aimed at distinguishing delay
favorable to the defendant from delay harmful to him; other-
wise the speedy trial defendant could enjoy the benefits of pre-
trial delay and then, if convicted, be released based on the sixth
amendment violation.2 04 The need for a speedy trial court to
make this assessment, however, obscures the fact that proce-
dural rights stressing access to the courts - such as the right to
202. See Cousart, 745 F.2d at 778 (refusing to find constitutional violation
although delay in hearing the appeal was lengthy, because there was "no
showing of bad faith or improper motive in the appointment of counsel or in
their delayed discovery of disqualifying factors"). This is particularly troub-
ling because it is very difficult for the defendant to gain access to evidence
demonstrating governmental bad faith.
203. See, e.g., Guam v. Olsen, 462 F. Supp. 608, 610, 613-14 n.7 (D. Guam
App. Div. 1978) (implying governmental bad faith in delay of transcript and
ordering release of prisoner). But see United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S.
302, 316 (1986) (a sixth amendment speedy trial case in which the Court, ap-
plying Barker, could find no governmental bad faith in a series of pre-trial in-
terlocutory appeals that were largely responsible for a 44-month delay
between indictment and trial, and ultimately found no sixth amendment
violation).
204. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 532 (1972).
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a speedy appeal - generally should be measured by the denial
of process. For example, in Peyton v. Rowe,20 5 the Court invali-
dated a federal rule that prohibited habeas petitioners serving
consecutive sentences from challenging a subsequent sentence
until the first sentence actually was served, because the rule
would increase unjust incarceration. 20 6 A prisoner serving con-
secutive sentences need only show that a court rejected his pe-
tition because he was not yet serving the challenged sentence to
establish a violation of Peyton. The prisoner does not need to
show that he was prejudiced by this denial; nor need he show
as a logical antecedent to prejudice that he would prevail on
the habeas claim.20 7
The right to a speedy appeal entails a cluster of concerns
similar to those enunciated in Peyton regarding access to the
courts, finality, and prevention of unjust incarceration. The
right of access to the courts generally is violated when access is
denied.20 8 Accordingly, the right to a speedy appeal is violated
when the appeal unreasonably is delayed and access to the
courts impaired. Prejudice may affect the severity of the viola-
tion or its remedy, but it is not necessary to establish whether a
violation has occurred. The right to a speedy appeal is a right
to receive certain process. The right is prophylactic and, thus,
its violation should not be measured by considering whether
the denial was prejudicial. The appropriate inquiry is not
whether denial of a speedy appeal was prejudicial, but whether,
as a rule, denial tends to increase unjust incarceration.
As an obvious corollary, and despite the Rheuark court's
analysis, 20 9 appellate prejudice cannot be measured by the same
factors as speedy trial prejudice. Courts tend to be unmoved by
the prospect of convicted defendants remaining incarcerated
pending appeal, particularly because many defendants already
have been deemed to present too great a risk of flight to be ad-
mitted to bail.210 Similarly, the convicted defendant's anxiety
205. 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
206. Id at 64-67.
207. Id. at 67.
208. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972) (stating that the "right to
be heard does not depend upon an advance showing that one will surely pre-
vail at the hearing").
209. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 303 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Barker standard to both speedy trials and appeals), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931
(1981).
210. Cf 1984 Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) (Supp. 1987). At least in
the federal system, the Bail Reform Act requires individuals seeking bail
pending appeal to demonstrate, inter alia, that they do not pose a risk of flight,
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regarding the outcome of his appeal carries little weight, in part
because of the inherently subjective nature of such a factor,
favoring the sensitive individual over the sanguine one with no
regard for the inherent constitutional merits of either defend-
ant's position.2 1 Pretrial incarceration and anxiety are inher-
ently oppressive because the prisoner still is cloaked in the
presumption of innocence.212 Although courts may assume that
prisoners have a due process right to a speedy appeal and final-
ity of judgment, they view the conviction as dissipating the pre-
sumption of innocence so that post-conviction incarceration and
anxiety are not presumptively prejudicial.
Courts thus focus on whether the delay compromised the
defendant's ability to present his appeal or his ability to mount
his defense in a possible retrial. A defendant whose trial is un-
justly delayed can show that witnesses' memories were dimmed
by time or that witnesses have become unavailable to testify on
his behalf.2 13 Such prejudice is straightforward. A defendant
whose appeal is delayed has a much heavier burden. Because
appeals generally depend only on the written trial record -
the "cold record" - it is difficult, in all but the most unusual
case, to show that the defendant's ability to present his appel-
late arguments has been impaired. Although some issues raised
on appeal may require an evidentiary hearing, such proceedings
are extremely rare and courts seldom, if ever, take cognizance
of the possibility of such a hearing when evaluating the prejudi-
cial nature of appellate delay. In fact, short of mistranscription
of the record or loss of segments of the record on appeal, it is
difficult to conceive how passage of time could impair the de-
fendant's ability to present his appeal.21 4
are not appealing for purposes of delay, and have some likelihood of success on
the merits. Id
211. Courts deem it pointless to consider the anxiety suffered by an indi-
vidual who is incarcerated pursuant to a justly imposed sentence, apparently
believing that the guilty are not anxious. Therefore, at most courts might con-
sider as prejudicial the anxiety suffered by a prisoner whose appeal is likely to
be successful. Moreover, if the prisoner already is incarcerated on a concur-
rent sentence, as is frequently the case, courts are unwilling to see how the
prisoner could suffer such anxiety.
212. See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973) (recognizing
prejudice from delayed trial even in the case of a prisoner already confined on
another charge). Moreover, the Constitution permits incarceration of pre-
sumptively innocent individuals without deeming it oppressive. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-50 (1987) (accepting constitutional-
ity of pretrial "preventive detention" of accused).
213. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
214. Intuitively, it seems reasonable to argue that the longer an appeal has
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If delay rarely prejudices the defendant's ability to present
his appeal, the sole remaining avenue to demonstrate prejudice
is whether, realistically speaking, the delay harmed the defend-
ant's ability to present his claims on retrial. The defendant's
ability to present claims on retrial, however, can be impaired
only if there is a retrial. Whether there is a retrial, in turn, de-
pends on the merits of the defendant's appeal.
This exposes the heart of the matter: under the Barker
standard, only a defendant who can convince the court he was
unjustly convicted can prove prejudice.2 1 5 It is, after all, entic-
ing to argue that an appellant whose appeal is without merit
cannot be prejudiced regardless of how badly his ability to pres-
ent that appeal is compromised, and regardless of how badly his
ability to present his defense at a retrial might be impaired.
Similarly, incarceration pending appeal does not prejudice an
individual serving a justly imposed sentence; anxiety pending
appeal does not prejudice a justly imprisoned individual be-
cause he should realize his appeal is without merit and his con-
viction final.
The problem with this analysis is twofold: first, it involves
the court in decisions it should not be making, and second, it
means that although every defendant ostensibly has a due pro-
cess right to a speedy appeal, only an unjustly convicted defend-
ant may enforce that right. As to the first, merit - or the lack
of it - cannot be a barrier to a state appeal-as-of-right. 216 The
factors that may prejudice the defendant's appeal also may
cause the appeal to appear unmeritorious.2 17 Furthermore, it is
been moldering, the more likely it is that the courts will affirm the underlying
conviction rather than face the situation in which a prisoner has been unjustly
incarcerated for a long time. For obvious reasons, it is impolitic to raise this
type of indeterminate prejudice before a court. Moreover, even if an appellant
were to raise the issue, it is very difficult to see how such a claim might be
demonstrated successfully, no matter how intuitively appealing it might be.
215. See United States v. Cifarelli, 401 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir.) (per curiam)
(reasoning that "delay in appeal is not truly prejudicial except in case of rever-
sal"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 987 (1968); see also Anarah v. Kriele, No. 88 Civ.
4917, slip op. at 11, 14-15 (S.D.N.Y. March 3, 1989) (LEXIS 1964, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file) (citing Cifarelli and holding that a three-and-one-half year ap-
pellate delay was not prejudicial).
216. Cf. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 497-99 (1963) (finding a due
process violation in requiring an indigent to convince the judge that his appeal
is not frivolous in order to receive transcript); Eskridge v. Washington State
Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214, 216 (1958) (per curiam) (finding
a due process violation in requiring an indigent to convince the judge that jus-
tice would be promoted by the appeal in order to receive transcript).
217. Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that "[t]he difficulties of estimating prejudice after
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unclear whether federal courts should judge the merits of state
court appeals. If federal courts decide the merits sub silentio,
as is most likely the case, the defendant may never get an op-
portunity to present his side of the case. Indeed, this scenario
presents many unattractive options, including the prospect of
federal courts deciding state law issues even before they are
presented to the state courts.
As to the second problem, a defendant who cannot prove
he was unjustly convicted may enjoy a "right" to a speedy ap-
peal, but it is difficult to ascribe any content to that right. Sim-
ply put, a right that cannot be violated is not very much of a
right at all. Part of the difficulty lies in the courts' measure-
ment of a speedy appeal violation from the perspective of the
wrong moment in time. Although courts recognize that every
individual enjoys a right of prompt access to the appellate pro-
cess, they determine whether a violation of that right has oc-
curred by looking at the probable outcome of the process. This
position is intrinsically illogical and unjust. Once the right to
be heard in the courts is recognized, it cannot be made to de-
pend - even after the fact - on a showing that the defendant
would have prevailed on the merits. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Peyton, the proper inquiry is whether the failure
to grant timely access will lead to an overall increase in unjust
incarceration. Once that determination is made by the courts
- as it has been in the case of speedy appeals - the determina-
tion in any individual case must focus on access and not on
outcome.
III. A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY: THE DIFFICULTY
OF DEVELOPING A REMEDY FOR VIOLATIONS
OF THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY APPEAL
Courts have chosen to define the right to a speedy appeal
by using the standard defining the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial. The analogy between speedy trials and speedy ap-
peals breaks down entirely, however, when courts attempt to
fashion a remedy for a violation of the right to a speedy appeal.
The sole constitutional remedy for a violation of the sixth
amendment speedy trial right is dismissal of the indictment.2 18
As one commentator astutely observed, this restricted choice of
the fact are exacerbated by the possibility that evidence of injury to the de-
fendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the incompetence
of defense counsel").
218. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).
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remedy has turned "the right of every criminal defendant to
have a speedy trial into a very different sort of right: the right
of a few defendants, most egregiously denied a speedy trial, to
have the criminal charges against them dismissed on that ac-
count. '219 Shrinking from this extreme remedy, courts refused
to find speedy trial violations except in the most outlandish
cases;220 the remedy effectively gutted the right.
Wary of such a result, courts consistently have attempted
to fashion limited remedies for speedy appeals violations.221
The end product has been unsatisfactory in the extreme. Rea-
soning that the harm rests in the state court's failure to hear
the defendant's appellate claims, federal courts fashion a rem-
edy that ensures the state court will hear the already delayed
appeal soon after the federal judgment is entered.222 Unfortu-
nately, in so doing the federal courts have ignored the practical
application of the Barker standard. The result, to the extent
that courts follow Barker, is that the defendant must prove that
delay has prejudiced his appeal in order to receive as relief the
very appeal on whose efficacy he has cast doubt.
219. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 525.
220. Barker was arguably such a case. The Supreme Court found that
Barker's sixth amendment rights were not violated by a delay of more than
five years between arrest and trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533-36
(1972).
221. Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987).
222. The right to a speedy trial entails the right to a timely resolution of
defendant's appeal; the interests of finality, legitimacy, and prevention of un-
just incarceration all require that the defendant's appeal be decided with rea-
sonable promptness. In most cases raising successful claims of appellate delay,
however, the federal court merely requires that the state appellate court hear
the case within a reasonable period of time, thereby focusing on argument of
the case or submission of briefs by the parties. Federal courts appear loathe to
require that state courts decide an appeal within a set amount of time, despite
the fact that, for the defendant, winning the right to present briefs to the
court without a prompt decision on the merits is the very definition of a pyr-
rhic victory. This reluctance to demand that a sister court decide an issue
within a set period of time results from concerns of comity and from a fear
that interference in the decisional process of another court might give rise to
new claims of due process violation if a defendant subsequently felt that his
case had not received proper consideration because of a court-imposed deci-
sional deadline. Although this problem tends to blur the reasoning in speedy
appeals cases, the ultimate interest at stake is a prompt resolution of the ap-
peal even though the courts articulate the analysis in terms of access rights
and the relief in terms of presentation of the appellate argument to the court.
The underlying assumption appears to be the (possibly naive) belief that once
the argument is before the state appellate court, the court will resolve the ap-
peal with appropriate dispatch in light of the complexity of the issues involved
and the demands of the case.
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As if recognizing that an appeal is inadequate relief for a
delayed appeal, courts often refer to the existence of alterna-
tive remedies for appellate delay, particularly in the form of
civil rights actions.223 When the same courts face civil rights
claims by defendants alleging a denial of the right to a speedy
appeal, however, they find principles of governmental immu-
nity and comity prevent them from awarding effective relief.
Thus, while the constitutional speedy trial remedy is so draco-
nian that it eviscerates the right, the speedy appeals remedies
are so inadequate that there is no meaningful redress for a vio-
lation of the right. As a result, states have little incentive to
remedy appellate delay.
A. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF AS A REMEDY FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT
TO A REASONABLY SPEEDY APPEAL
Speedy appeals cases generally reach the federal courts as
petitions for habeas corpus. This procedural posture imports
problems of its own. Relief under habeas corpus is restricted to
remedies affecting custody.22 4 If a habeas corpus petitioner is
able to show that state court appellate delay has reached the
level of a constitutional violation, federal district courts gener-
ally grant a conditional order of release. This "conditional
writ" takes the form of an order discharging the prisoner from
custody if the state court fails to meet a specified condition -
in these cases, hearing the appeal - within a specified time.225
223. E.g., Simmons v. Reynolds, 708 F. Supp. 505, 510-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(suggesting that habeas corpus petitioner's appropriate remedy is under
§ 1983); Doescher v. Estelle, 477 F. Supp. 932, 934 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (discuss-
ing various remedies available when substantial delay occurs in appellate pro-
cess, including relief under civil rights statutes), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980).
224. E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973); see discussion of
conditional discharge from custody in D. WILKES, supra note 134, § 8-34, at
190-91.
225. The Supreme Court first recognized the "conditional release" order in
1894. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 261-62 (1894). After Bonner the constitution-
ality of such orders has been affirmed repeatedly by the Court. See, e.g.,
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (noting that "[i]n construing
§ 2243 and its predecessors [the federal habeas corpus statute], this Court has
repeatedly stated that federal courts may delay the release of a successful peti-
tioner in order to provide the State an opportunity to correct the constitu-
tional violation found by the court" (citations omitted)). By the 1940s or 1950s,
the conditional release order had virtually replaced the unconditional release
order as the preferred form of relief in all but a limited category of habeas
corpus cases. See 1 J. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 8.5, at 108-12 (1988).
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If a petitioner satisfies the Barker requirement that he show
prejudice, this conventional choice of remedy is both inade-
quate and incoherent. Moreover, it is unclear whether a condi-
tional discharge adequately redresses unconstitutional appellate
delay, no matter how courts construe the violation.
1. The Formal Problem: The Use of the Conditional Order
of Release
The deep reluctance of federal courts to interfere in state
court criminal process permeates their consideration of appel-
late delay, particularly affecting habeas corpus actions.226 Thus,
once the district court finds a constitutional violation, the con-
ditional order of release usually gives state courts thirty, sixty,
or ninety days to hear the delayed appeal before the prisoner
will be discharged.227 In rare cases, federal courts have allowed
226. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1381 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(noting that "[c]omity assumes that the state court will decide the case with
dispatch and that the federal court should not intervene if an act of this Court
will not accelerate disposition of the appeal"), aff'd, 811 F.2d 133 (2d Cir.
1987); Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987, 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (reasoning that
"[ilt would be inappropriate to foreclose the state appellate courts from decid-
ing the case now that petitioner's counsel has filed a brief apparently raising
the appropriate issues on appeal and the matter is sub judice in the state
court"); Morales Roque v. Puerto Rico, 558 F.2d 606, 607 (1st Cir. 1976) (per
curiam). In Morales Roque, the district court ordered that the prisoner be re-
leaed on bail while awaiting a delayed appeal in a commonwealth court, de-
spit the fact that the offense of which the prisoner had been convicted was
nonbailable under Puerto Rican law. 558 F.2d at 607. The circuit court re-
versed the decision, holding that the lower court:
should balance the Commonwealth's interest in not admitting a con-
victed defendant to bail against the petitioner's due process right to a
reasonably prompt appeal, and weigh the actions of the Common-
wealth and the defense which have contributed to the delay.
In this case, we believe the district court should initially have
limited itself to entering a conditional order giving the Common-
wealth a period of time, for example six months, to provide petitioner
with a transcript and take other designated steps assuring prompt dis-
position of his appeal, after which period of time, if adequate progress
were still not observed, an order admitting defendant to bail would
issue.
Id. (citation omitted).
227. In case of appellate delay, the length of time chosen by the court to
permit the state to remedy the violation seems to reflect the federal court's
assessment of the severity of the constitutional violation before it. E.g., Brooks
v. Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 30 (2d Cir. 1989). In Brooks, the Second Circuit over-
turned a district court finding that the habeas corpus petitioner had not ex-
hausted his state remedies, and ordered that the prisoner be released if the
state did not hear his appeal within 60 days from the date of the decision, re-
fusing to stay its mandate the customary three weeks. Brooks was serving a
total of 11 to 22 years for two state convictions on assault and weapons
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state courts up to six months to hear an appeal, reasoning that
the challenged delay was insufficiently severe to warrant a
more speedy remedy.2 28 The formal nature of the conditional
order of release presents troubling issues that are worth consid-
ering before turning to the substantive problems presented by
granting an appeal as a remedy for appellate delay.
The ostensible purpose of the conditional writ is to demon-
strate deference to state institutions by allowing the state to
remedy its own failings. 229 The filing of the habeas corpus peti-
tion itself, however, gives the state notice of a possible constitu-
tional violation. At the same time that the state is responding
to the petition, it could act to remedy the alleged constitutional
violation.230 In fact, the district court often expects the state to
take remedial measures while the habeas corpus petition is
pending.231 It therefore is unclear why federal courts, after
finding the delay already has reached constitutional magnitude,
regularly give the states an additional few months to hear the
appeal.232 An advocate might argue that these grace periods
merely extend the period of constitutional violation. As a de-
tached observer, one can only say that the lengthy grace period
illustrates the federal courts' fundamental ambivalence toward
post-conviction relief directed at state court proceedings.
The federal briefing schedule on appeal or in habeas corpus
charges. Id. at 30. His appeal was delayed some eight years, a delay that the
court found "makes a mockery of the right to appeal and cannot be over-
looked." Id. at 32.
228. E.g., Hampton v. Kelly, No. 88 Civ. 0528, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.
29, 1988) (LEXIS 13999, Genfed library, Dist file), appeal dismissed, 876 F.2d
890 (2d Cir. 1989). This, of course, raises the question of whether a violation
existed in the first place. To find a due process violation but then to order a
remedy permitting the violation to continue for six months because the viola-
tion was not a very serious infringement of the appellant's rights is peculiar, to
say the least.
229. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 226.
230. See, e.g., Wheeler, 639 F. Supp. at 1381 (noting that "lt is unques-
tioned that the mere filing of the petition accelerated the resolution of
Wheeler's appeal"); cf Guam v. Olsen, 462 F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Guam App.
Div. 1978) (noting "cause-and-effect" relationship between preparation of
delayed transcript and filing of motion claiming appellate delay).
231. See Jacob v. Henderson, No. 86 Civ. 3450, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
20, 1987) (LEXIS 14137, Genfed library, Dist file) and Thomas v. Harris, No. 86
Civ. 4214 slip op. at 6-7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1987) (LEXIS 14137, Genfed library,
Dist file) (Jacob and Thomas are consolidated cases). In discussing the state's
responsibility for the delay of the appeals Judge Korman remarked that
"[t]hese include.., the failure of the Appellate Division to take effective ac-
tion on delays brought to its attention either by petitioners or by myself (in an
informal effort to secure the filing of the briefs)." Id.
232. See supra note 222.
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actions rarely is less than two months, and decisions seldom is-
sue promptly on the filing of the state's brief. It is worth ask-
ing, then, why states do not "moot out" cases of appellate delay
by expediting the state court briefing schedule after receiving
the prisoner's habeas corpus petition.233 It is indicative of the
intractable nature of the problem of appellate delay that this is
not the typical result. The failure of the states to redress cases
of appellate delay militates in favor of more drastic remedies
than merely setting a briefing schedule that allows the state an
additional sixty days to hear an already delayed appeal.
Another peculiar issue raised by the conditional order of
release is whether the court actually has found a constitutional
violation or merely has found that a constitutional violation
would exist at the end of the grace period if the state does not
comply with the condition attached to the district court's order.
If no constitutional violation exists when the district court is-
sues its opinion, it would seem the court has issued an advisory
opinion on facts not yet before it. On the other hand, if a con-
stitutional violation does exist and the district court is merely
giving state courts a reasonable amount of time to remedy that
violation, it would seem any grace period merely compounds
the existing constitutional violation.234
2. The Substantive Problem: The Choice of the Appeal as a
Remedy for a Prejudicially Delayed Appeal
To prevail under the Barker standard as applied to appeals,
the habeas corpus petitioner must show that delay has
prejudiced his appeal. After requiring the petitioner to demon-
strate that the delay rendered his appeal constitutionally in-
firm, it is ironic that the courts respond with an order that the
prisoner receive that very appeal, with the prejudice and irony
compounded by a further delay. The federal courts' preference
for granting the appeal as a remedy reflects several concerns.
The first, born of comity, is a desire to permit the state to clean
233. Simmons v. Reynolds, 708 F. Supp. 505, 510-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(although holding that a six year delay in hearing appeal violated due process,
the district court was unable to grant relief because the state court heard the
appeal and affirmed the conviction during pendency of petition. The court
suggested that the prisoner could bring a civil rights action for damages).
234. See LaFrance v. Bollinger, 487 F.2d 506, 507 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding
that when petitioner served most of his sentence at the time of his successful
challenge to delayed appeal, immediate release was appropriate); United
States ex rel. McMullen v. Meyers, 257 F. Supp. 812, 814 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1966)
(same).
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its own house.235 The second is a desire for a more limited rem-
edy than discharge, the fundamental remedy in habeas corpus.
The aim of the federal courts is simply "to counteract any re-
sulting prejudice demonstrated by a petitioner. '236 According
to conventional wisdom, because the prejudice arises from the
denial of the appeal, the appeal should be granted. Anything
more would be a windfall.
The logic of this position rests on an ambiguity in the fed-
eral courts' application of Barker to appellate delay. If the prej-
udice inheres simply in the delay of the appeal, ordering the
state to discharge the prisoner unless the appeal is heard within
a reasonable time may well be the appropriate remedy. If the
delay alone is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice, however,
and almost all courts hold that it is, granting the prisoner an
appeal is inadequate to counteract the prejudice.
Consider this rather extreme case: Appellate counsel dis-
covers that the court clerk's office has no record of a notice of
appeal. The state appellate court almost certainly will find that
the defendant has waived his right to appeal and he therefore
will be unable to present his claims, however meritorious, to
the state court. The defendant is certain that trial counsel
properly filed the notice of appeal. The delay is so long, how-
ever, that trial counsel no longer has an independent recollec-
tion of filing the notice of appeal and no longer retains records
of the case. All counsel can aver is that it is his practice to file
a notice of appeal after every sentencing. As likely as not, the
clerk's office misfiled the notice of appeal, but because of the
delay the defendant has no way to prove this. Obviously a con-
ditional order of release is inadequate in this case. Even if the
state hears the defendant's appeal, the delay precludes the de-
fendant from presenting his case to the court in the same way
as without the delay.2 37
235. See supra note 226 (listing cases).
236. Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987).
237. The difficulties are equally patent in cases in which the petitioner has
shown that delay will adversely affect his retrial. To show that delay impaired
his ability to present his case on retrial, the petitioner must demonstrate that
he is likely to succeed on appeal. All the missing witnesses and faulty memo-
ries in the world are not prejudicial if they will never be called on in a retrial.
Having found both that the petitioner's appeal is likely to be successful and
that a retrial would be distorted by the delay, however, it is perverse for a
court to presume that granting the petitioner his appeal will dispel the preju-
dice.
It may be argued that not all successful appeals result in retrials; some
may result in resentencing or other limited outcomes. It also can be claimed
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Ordering a relatively prompt appeal after prejudicial delay
cannot put the prisoner in as favorable a position as if the ap-
peal had been heard promptly. The petitioner only receives
what he was constitutionally entitled to receive from the out-
set, a direct appeal of his conviction. Nothing in the remedy
compensates the petitioner for the prejudicial effects of the de-
lay.238 If the remedy is designed to counteract the prejudicial
violation, a sort of constitutional zero-sum game, merely order-
ing the state to hear the appeal leaves prisoner's position sub-
stantially below the zero starting point.239
The inadequacy of conditional orders of release to remedy
violations of the right to a speedy appeal is even more obvious
when the jurisdiction suffers from a pattern of appellate de-
lay.240 The possibility that a particular petitioner will be re-
leased if his appeal is not heard within a few months after he
wins a federal case does not provide a meaningful incentive for
that the prosecution is unlikely to retry a defendant whose appeal has been so
long delayed. Although this may be true, once the district court has required
the prisoner to demonstrate that his appeal is prejudiced by the impairment of
his ability to present his defense on retrial as a threshold to obtaining a rem-
edy, it is logically inconsistent to disregard that finding for purposes of grant-
ing the remedy.
238. Even in the speedy trial context, the trial is a remedy only before the
delays become prejudicial. Once the petitioner proves prejudice and demon-
strates a subsequent constitutional violation, dismissal is the only remedy.
Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).
239. The successful appellant has been improperly incarcerated during the
length of the delay. Even if a court merely modifies a sentence or reduces a
count from a felony to a misdemeanor, a prisoner still is prejudiced by the in-
carceration pursuant to such a conviction during the time in which the appeal
has been improperly delayed. For example, the overall length of the pris-
oner's sentence may affect his eligibility for parole and the prison to which he
is assigned. Similarly, the severity of the crime may have affected the sentenc-
ing judge in his initial imposition of sentence, and also may have an impact on
the privileges the prisoner may receive while incarcerated. In the federal sys-
tem, a sentence with several counts running concurrently or consecutively is
viewed as a "package." When one element of the package is modified, the en-
tire sentence is vacated and is remanded for resentencing. E.g., McClain v.
United States, 643 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 452 U.S. 919 (1981). This
is not always the case in state courts. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 111 A.D.2d 264,
267, 489 N.Y.S.2d 536, 537 (1985) (following New York practice permitting
court to modify judgment and vacate sentence for two counts of a three count
conviction, without vacating entire sentence or resentencing defendant).
240. Although showing a pattern of delay is neither a necessary nor a suffi-
cient condition for demonstrating a constitutional violation in any individual
case, courts should entertain different considerations when a petitioner dem-
onstrates that his case is part of an ongoing pattern of constitutional violations.
In this situation, it is not enough simply to address the individual violation; the
court must consider the systemic effects of its decision.
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states to remedy systemic problems of appellate delay. State
courts and justice departments turn their attention to appeals
that face a deadline imposed by a conditional order of release,
and hear the appeals in time to keep the prisoners incarcer-
ated.24 1 Thus, the state faces no penalty for appellate delay
from a conditional order of release. As numerous federal
courts have learned with dismay, the real measure of the right
to a speedy appeal is the length of time it takes for the federal
courts to issue a conditional order of release, plus the grace pe-
riod granted in the conditional order.242 Because the condi-
tional order of release does not require the state to do anything
beyond what it otherwise would have done, the remedy does
not induce the state to correct the deficiencies causing appellate
delay.
The Third Circuit recognized the weaknesses of the condi/
tional order in Burkett v. Cunningham,24 3 identifying three sitj-
uations in which any remedy short of discharge might b&
inadequate: (1) "where attempting an alternate remedy would
not vitiate the prejudice of the fundamental unfairness or
would itself violate a petitioner's constitutional rights," (2) in
"exceptionally egregious circumstances" in which the delay vio-
lated the 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the
base of our civil and political institutions,'" and (3) "where
lesser remedies prove ineffective in curbing a continuing due
process violation."244 This last exception apparently refers to
situations in which the state 6ourts have failed to meet the
terms of a lesser remedy than discharge.245
Arguably, the Barker v. Wingo standard causes every un-
constitutionally delayed appeal to fall within the exceptions de-
241. Cf. Rivera v. Concepcion, 469 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that
delay of two years in preparation of trial transcript is not "overcome by a pres-
ent exercise of diligence and treated as if it had not occurred. Any such rule
would mean that a defendant may be freely given improper consideration until
the system, or the parties at fault, are caught out").
242. See, e.g., Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasizing
that "[t]he federal courts should not be the place where incarcerated defend-
ants must go in order to call attention to the neglect they face and the denial
of their right to have their appeals heard before they have spent a substantial
amount of time in jail. We hope that the time will not come when fhe situa-
tion must be dealt with by prompt action in federal district court whenever it
is clear that state prisoners' requests are being ignored.").
24 26 F.2d 1208 (3d Ci9
244. Id. at 1222 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790
(1977)).
245. Md
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lineated by the Third Circuit in Burkett.246 This result is
perhaps the clearest indication of the lack of fit between right
and remedy in the speedy appeal context. If appellate delay is
serious enough to merit a remedy under Barker, the appeal is
an inadequate remedy because it cannot vitiate the prejudice.
Conversely, courts outraged at long appellate delays are
tempted to pay lip service to the Barker standard, presume
prejudice, and order conditional release. In either event, only
outrageous cases of delay receive a remedy and in neither event
does the court recognize that it is the delay itself that merits a
remedy.
B. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF RELIEF UNDER 42 U.S.C.
SECTION 1983
Indicating some uneasiness with the results of habeas
corpus actions, federal courts have suggested that prisoners
may seek damages to compensate them for the suffering caused
by state appellate delay.247 The chief vehicle for such damages
is a suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.248 Indeed, section 1983 is
the major alternative to habeas corpus for defendants com-
plaining of state appellate delay. A defendant suing under sec-
tion 1983 may demand either monetary or injunctive relief.
Under current law, however, a defendant is apt to receive
neither.
246. For example, the Burkett court recognized that "[o]nce the time that
constitutes the delay has elapsed no remedy can call it back. Where delay is so
extreme as to assume constitutional proportions, discharge thus becomes less
of an unlikely remedy." Id. It seems, then, that once delay is long enough to
trigger a serious inquiry into whether a due process violation has occurred,
under the Burkett calculus, the presumption shifts away from simply ordering
that an appeal be granted.
247. E.g., Doescher v. Estelle, 477 F. Supp. 932, 934 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 1979),
aff'd in part and vacated in part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980).
248. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Colum-
bia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States... to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). States and their subdivisions, however, are not "per-
sons" within the meaning of § 1983 and accordingly may not be sued under
that statute. Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973). Thus, a suit naming
only a state probation department for delaying a pre-sentence report would be
barred. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2308-12
(1989) (holding that neither states nor state officials acting in their official ca-
pacities are "persons" under § 1983).
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The Barker standard notwithstanding, unless an appellant
demonstrates significant prejudice, he is entitled only to nomi-
nal damages in a civil rights action.249 Such prejudice is, at the
very least, difficult to show in cases of appellate delay. On the
other hand, even if a prisoner demonstrates prejudice to the
court's satisfaction, he still faces significant barriers to mone-
tary relief. The eleventh amendment bars compensatory dam-
ages out of state treasuries in such cases, despite permitting
some forms of prospective relief to compel state compliance
with federal law.2 50 Even in suits against municipalities and
other government entities, plaintiffs encounter major barriers
to relief. First, section 1983 does not override traditional com-
mon law immunities such as sovereign immunity or judicial im-
munity.251 Second, although plaintiffs may sue municipal
249. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978). Carey recognizes that
traditional tort concepts apply to the calculation of damages under § 1983. I&
at 257-58. Accordingly, a plaintiff who cannot prove that he has been
prejudiced by a violation of his rights is not entitled to monetary relief under
§ 1983, even on a theory of exemplary damages. Hd at 262-64. The Court, how-
ever, did recognize that a plaintiff who was denied due process but was not
prejudiced by the denial might be entitled to nominal damages. Id. at 266-67.
250. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). The eleventh amendment
provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." The eleventh amendment does not forbid suit in federal
court by a citizen against a self-governing political subdivision of a state, such
as a city or a county. State immunity under the eleventh amendment also
does not preclude a federal court from taking jurisdiction over an action
against a state officer to enjoin him from enforcing an unconstitutional state
statute, even though the court's decree will impose a burden on the state's
treasury. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 288-90 (1977). In such actions, the
officer is regarded as having acted without the lawful authority of the state,
because the state has no power to violate the federal Constitution. The action
thus is not one against the state but against the officer in an individual capac-
ity. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60.
The eleventh amendment also does not bar federal court actions to re-
cover damages against state officials for past wrongs when the judgment is
against the state officer personally. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-69
(1974) (limiting relief available under Ex Parte Young to remedies without sig-
nificant direct financial impact on the state). In such actions, however, an ex-
ecutive officer may claim immunity from personal liability if he acted in good
faith and under the reasonable belief that the actions taken were justified.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). Judges, prosecutors, and legis-
lators enjoy an absolute common law immunity from personal liability for
their official actions. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 422, 423 n.20
(1976).
251. The Supreme Court has been concerned that the threat of monetary
liability in § 1983 actions for damages would deter public officials from the ex-
ecution of their official duties. Accordingly, the Court has held that prosecu-
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entities under section 1983, they may receive relief only if they
demonstrate that the conduct complained of "implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision
officially adopted or promulgated" by government officers.252
Moreover, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the official pol-
icy or regulation exhibits "deliberate indifference" to the rights
of citizens, and is very closely linked to the constitutional
violation.253
This patchwork of rules and immunities virtually excludes
any award of monetary relief for appellate delay under section
1983. For example, in Rheuark v. Shaw, the three Texas pris-
oners sued under section 1983 for both injunctive and monetary
relief, claiming damages against the court reporters, the super-
vising judge, the county in which the court was situated, and
various officials charged with allocating money to pay the court
reporters. The Fifth Circuit held that the judge enjoyed abso-
lute judicial immunity and that the court reporter enjoyed
qualified immunity as long as he acted in good faith and within
the scope of his official duties.254 Because the local court had
authority to appoint additional court reporters even if the ap-
pointments caused budget overruns, the Fifth Circuit also rea-
soned that the county and its officials were not the proximate
cause of the delay. Without proximate cause, the county de-
fendants were relieved of liability, and the blame for the delays
was fixed wholly on the judicially immune supervising judge.255
tors are absolutely immune from liability for damages under § 1983, Imbler,
424 U.S. at 431, and that executive officials have a qualified immunity,
Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48 (holding that immunity is based on good faith cou-
pled with reasonable grounds to believe the action was legal). The scope of
that qualified immunity was defined further in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308, 317-22 (1975), in which the liability of state executive officers for viola-
tions of § 1983 was limited to acts that were known, or should have been
known to be unconstitutional, or that were maliciously intended to cause in-
jury. The Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed its commitment to the ap-
plication of common law immunities to actions framed under § 1983. See, e.g.,
Will, 109 S. Ct. at 2309 (citing, inter alia, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1986) (stating
that "[o]ur initial inquiry is whether an official claiming immunity under
§ 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the privilege he asserts").
252. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
253. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (1989).
254. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 304-05 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450
U.S. 931 (1981). The district court found that the officials enjoyed legislative
immunity, a ground that the circuit court opinion did not discuss. Rheuark v.
Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 921-22 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980).
255. Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 305-07 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
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In the end, there was no one left for the plaintiffs to sue.256
Injunctive relief under section 1983 is even less likely than
monetary relief in cases alleging state appellate delay.257 An
extensive body of Supreme Court doctrine counsels against in-
junctive intervention in state court criminal proceedings.258
The Supreme Court has advised repeatedly that "principles of
equity, comity, and federalism... must restrain a federal court
when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding. '259 In particu-
lar, the Court has warned against any injunction that would re-
quire "continuous supervision by the federal court" over a state
criminal justice system.260 Even periodic reporting by state
courts to federal courts would be "antipathetic to established
principles of comity."2 6 1 Faced with this precedent, it is un-
likely that a federal court would enter an injunction against the
state courts in order to remedy systemic problems of appellate
delay.262
Framing the lawsuit as a class action does not alleviate
these problems. Although a class action has the virtue of ad-
dressing systemic problems on a systemic basis, courts seem rel-
atively inhospitable to class certification motions involving
underlying claims of appellate delay. For example, in a recent
256. The Fifth Circuit partially overturned the district court opinion that
found the county liable for damages and awarded two of the prisoners a nomi-
nal award of one dollar each. The third prisoner, whose conviction was over-
turned on appeal and who was able to show that he had been improperly
incarcerated for three months, was awarded $3000. The district court required
that each prisoner show prejudice in order to be entitled to an award of com-
pensatory damages. In a somewhat baffling move, however, the court also fol-
lowed conventional harmless error analysis, and required defendants to show
lack of prejudice as well, by showing that 1) plaintiff's conviction was affirmed
on appeal, or 2) that on retrial plaintiff was convicted again. Rheuark, 477 F.
Supp. at 917.
257. Injunctive relief is limited in that any action challenging the custody
of an individual defendant must be brought as an action for habeas corpus.
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475 (1973)).
258. E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42, 53 (1971) (counseling both re-
straint with interference with state court criminal actions and careful scrutiny
of plaintiffs' standing in cases requesting injunctive relief that would affect
state criminal proceedings).
259. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
260. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 501.
261. Id. at 501 (citing Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966)). In fact,
O'Shea alleges racial bias, arguably an even more compelling constitutional vi-
olation than that of a delayed appeal. Md at 490-93.
262. Section 1983 falls within the expressly authorized exceptions to the
absolute bar against federal court injunctions directed at state court proceed-
ings provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
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section 1983 case arising in New York, an indigent prisoner
sought class certification for equal protection and due process
claims arising from the state courts' failure to supervise as-
signed counsel and from the delay in providing transcripts to
indigent criminal appellants.263 The putative plaintiff class con-
sisted of all presently incarcerated state criminal appellants
represented by appointed counsel on whose behalf briefs had
not been submitted within one year of the filing of a notice of
appeal, or whose appeals had not been decided within two years
of the notice of appeal. The district court found that the factual
differences underlying each claim of delay precluded class cer-
tification and that, in any event, Barker demanded a case-by-
case determination of whether appellate delay violated the
Constitution.264 Indeed, the district court flatly rejected the
claim that the appellate delay itself prejudiced the plaintiff
class, explaining that an individualized showing of prejudice
was the "essence" of the Barker standard.265
Even if a criminal appellant were to prove a constitutional
violation, section 1983 does not provide a realistic remedy for
state appellate delay. If he seeks monetary damages, the elev-
enth amendment and immunity doctrines, as well as the
requirement that he prove substantial prejudice, render relief
unlikely. If he seeks an injunction ordering his release from
custody, he will be told that such relief is unavailable under
section 1983, and that challenges to individual custody must be
brought as petitions for habeas corpus.266 If he seeks any other
263. Mathis v. Bess, 692 F. Supp. 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
264. Id. at 255-56. The court contended that:
Barker expressly provides that an analysis of whether any given delay
rises to the level of a constitutional violation is to be done on a case-
by-case basis. Wallace v. Kern, 499 F.2d 1345 (2d Cir. 1974) (Barker
expressly rejects the notion that the right to a speedy trial can be
quantified into a specific time period). Barker specifically anticipates
that a 'delay' may constitute a constitutional violation in one case but
not in another. Thus, under Barker questions of fact or law as to ap-
pellate delays remain individual considerations. Wallace, 499 F.2d at
1350 (2d Cir. 1974) (absent a specific showing of prejudice to the de-
fense, a relatively long period of delay may not be transformed into a
constitutional violation).
Id. at 256.
265. Mathis, 692 F. Supp. at 256. The district court properly, if short-
sightedly, applied conventional analysis. The result, however, underlines the
weakness of the Barker standard as a judicial tool for dealing with claims of
appellate delay.
266. There also are significant problems of standing. For example, one
prisoner, frustrated by a delay of nearly two years, sued his assigned counsel
under § 1983 requesting, inter alia, certain documents. In part because the
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form of injunctive relief, he will learn that comity bars virtu-
ally any federal oversight of or interference in state criminal
processes. Although a plaintiff may prevail under section 1983,
he will have precious little to show for his victory.26 7
IV. AN EFFECTIVE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY APPEAL
Once a state grants a defendant a direct appeal-as-of-right,
due process dictates that the appeal meet certain standards, in-
cluding that the defendant's appeal be heard with reasonable
speed. Current doctrine defining this right to a speedy appeal,
however, is in a remarkably immature state. The prevalence of
the Barker standard is as much a result as a cause of this diffi-
culty. The interaction of available remedies with the Barker
standard has created a perverse situation: the standard for
demonstrating a violation of the right to a speedy appeal is im-
possibly high, and once a violation is proven, courts lack an ef-
fective remedy. The federal courts' relentless focus on whether
the defendant has suffered prejudice from appellate delay is in-
appropriate as a matter of logic and constitutional doctrine.
Moreover, this focus diverts the courts from the more critical
issue of fashioning meaningful remedies for delayed appeals. 268
prisoner received the record, the suit was dismissed. The delay then continued
for six more years. Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 31 (2d Cir. 1989). But see De-
lancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (holding
that receipt of delayed transcript did not moot claim; prisoner entitled to pur-
sue claim for damages).
267. Some courts suggest that court reporters and attorneys who are found
to be responsible for appellate delays ought to be referred to professional disci-
pline. See, e.g., Rogers v. Kroger Co., 669 F.2d 317, 322 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982) (indi-
cating that attorney discipline would be "the most just initial sanction where
the attorney is primarily to blame in the delay"). These proceedings should be
in addition to, and not a substitute for, remedies directly addressing the consti-
tutional violation. A defendant whose attorney has given ineffective assistance
is not told to accept a grievance hearing before the local bar or a malpractice
suit as a substitute for a hearing on the merits of his constitutional claim on
either direct appeal or habeas corpus. E.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537
(1986). The same principles should apply to violations of the right to a speedy
appeal.
268. For an example of the inadequacy of current remedies, see, e.g.,
Claytor v. Hoke, No. 87 Civ. 2918, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 1987) (LEXIS
12385, Genfed library, Dist file), in which a prisoner served eight years, more
than half his minimum sentence, while waiting for his appeal to be heard.
During this period, a co-defendant's conviction was overturned, yet the defend-
ant's only relief was a conditional order of release if his appeal were not de-
cided in three months. Id.
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A. A REVISED STANDARD FOR EVALUATING APPELLATE
DELAY
The starting point for any effort to rationalize the jurispru-
dence of appellate delay must be the development of a more
workable standard for measuring unconstitutional delay. In
this regard, the Supreme Court's decision in Barker can be in-
structive. The Barker Court cautioned against attempting to
develop an unduly rigid standard in an area in which the inter-
ests of speed and fair treatment are not always in harmony. 269
Noting that a right involving speed of process has an "amor-
phous quality," the Court stated that such rights require "a
functional analysis . . . in the particular context of [each]
case." 270 Thus, the Court explained that the essential task in
developing such a standard was to identify factors that courts
should weigh to determine whether a constitutional violation
had occurred, while balancing the interests that the right seeks
to protect.27 1
The chief interests promoted by the right to a speedy ap-
peal are finality, legitimacy of judgments, and the prevention of
unjust incarceration.27 2 These factors are preferable to those
enunciated in Barker273 because they reflect the purpose of ap-
pellate review. The Rheuark274 adaptation of Barker simply
transfers legitimate pretrial concerns, prevention of excessive
pretrial incarceration, minimization of the accused's anxiety,
and limitation of the potential for impairment of the accused's
defense, 275 into a post-conviction setting in which these con-
cerns lose much of their force and create significant anomalies.
Focusing on factors going to the purpose of appellate review,
rather than on some of its ancillary effects, avoids these diffi-
culties. Moreover, the interests of finality, legitimacy, and pre-
vention of unjust incarceration are interests shared by
defendant and society alike. This last point is particularly sig-
269. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972) (reasoning that "[i]t is ...
impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. We
cannot definitely say how long is too long in a system where justice is sup-
posed to be swift but deliberate.").
270. Id. at 522.
271. Id at 530.
272. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710-11 (1984) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 63 (1968) (discussing federal
habeas corpus); Resnik, supra note 5, at 609-13.
273. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-32.
274. Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 303 n.8 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 931 (1981).
275. Id. (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532).
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nificant in selecting the factors to be weighed in finding a viola-
tion of the speedy appeal right.
Close examination of decisions applying the right to a
speedy trial reveals only two elements that clearly are relevant
to finding a constitutional violation. The first and foremost fac-
tor is the length of the delay, which acts as a "triggering mech-
anism" for further constitutional inquiry.2 7 6 The second is the
circumstances leading to the delay.2 77 This latter element in-
cludes an examination of the complexity of the case, the appel-
late issues present, and the responsibility of the various parties
for causing the delay.2 7 8 As to the last consideration, courts
generally consider pertinent the conduct of the prosecution,
court personnel, court reporters, and appointed counsel, as well
as the state court's activity in monitoring its own calendar.2 7 9
Although courts have dwelled on the defendant's own conduct,
as opposed to that of his counsel, this concern largely is an arti-
fact of the "demand" element of Barker.28 0 Courts may give
some weight to the defendant's own efforts to speed the appeal,
particularly when he has appointed counsel, but courts should
not view the defendant's conduct as a separate and necessary
factor as they do under the present Barker dictated analysis.
28 1
276. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
277. This two factor model is best seen in decisions such as Wheeler v.
Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1378-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1986), which applied the Barker
standard but proposed that the delay element be viewed as a function of the
"complexity of the litigation, the advocacy of the parties, and the institutional
vigilance of the Court." Id at 1378. At the same time, the Wheeler court en-
gaged in a detailed but strained effort to find prejudice from the delay. Id. at
1381; see also Doescher v. Estelle, 477 F. Supp. 932, 933-34 (N.D. Tex. 1979)
(Doescher II) (discussing the Barker standard), aff'd in part and vacated in
part, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980). But see Gimenez v. Leonardo, 702 F. Supp.
43, 45-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (focusing on length of delay first, court found that
three year delay does not trigger further inquiry and denied relief).
278. See, e.g., Wheeler, 639 F. Supp. at 1378.
279. See, e.g., Claytor v. Hoke, No. 87 Civ. 2918, slip op. at 6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
7, 1987) (LEXIS 12385, Genfed library, Dist file) (discussing ineffective state
calendar control); Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987, 992-93 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(discussing failure of appointed counsel and failure of state courts to exercise
proper calendar control); Guam v. Olsen, 462 F. Supp. 608, 609-10 (D. Guam
App. Div. 1978) (releasing defendant due to court reporter's failure to provide
transcript); Odsen v. Moore, 445 F.2d 806, 807 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (or-
dering district court to hold hearing regarding petitioner's allegations that
court clerk ignored his protests regarding inaction of appointed counsel).
280. See discussion in Wheeler, 639 F. Supp. at 1378-81, and Harris, 601 F.
Supp. at 992-93.
281. See Claytor, No. 87 Civ. 2918, slip op. at 3 (calling a situation
"Kafkaesque" in which appellant was unable to obtain assistance in expediting
his appeal from either appointed counsel or the court's oversight mechanism).
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In effect, the appropriate test for unconstitutional appellate de-
lay is whether the delay is reasonable under the circumstances
of the case, weighing all the relevant factors.
Because appellate delay does not implicate many of the
considerations relevant to evaluating pretrial delay, some of the
Barker factors are irrelevant at the appellate stage. In particu-
lar, Barker's emphasis on the defendant's "demand" for a
speedier trial and on a showing of prejudice were designed to
sift constitutionally impermissible pretrial delay from delay
that was courted by the defendant or favored a defense ver-
dict.28 2 Requiring the defendant to show prejudice does not ad-
vance the interests of finality and legitimacy and creates
unworkable distinctions when applied to post-trial incarcera-
tion. Indeed, elimination of the prejudice factor will do much
to clarify and effectuate the right to a speedy appeal. By em-
phasizing prejudice in a way not even envisioned by the Barker
decision, courts have created an ineffective standard for appel-
late delay, under which appellants can prove prejudice only in
the most freakish case. Eliminating prejudice as an element of
unconstitutional appellate delay permits the federal courts to
take seriously the right to a speedy appeal without engaging in
strained analysis.
B. THE SLIDING SCALE OF REMEDIES
One of the greatest difficulties in sixth amendment speedy
trial doctrine is that the sole remedy for a violation of the right
is dismissal.283 Because the remedy is so drastic, constitutional
speedy trial violations rarely were found in any but the most
egregious case. To avoid this problem, courts applying Barker
to state appellate delays recognized that due process, even in
the context of habeas corpus actions, required a remedy tai-
lored to counteract the harm proven by the defendant. Courts
therefore selected the remedy that superficially appeared to
counteract the lack of an appeal: they made sure that the de-
fendant received his appeal. Unfortunately, this remedy did
not redress the prejudice arising from the delay or the more
specific prejudice required under Barker. Thus, the courts
saved the right to a speedy appeal by sacrificing both the effi-
cacy of the remedy and the consistency of the standard.
Both constitutional speedy trial and speedy appeals cases
282. Barker, 407 U.S. at 521.
283. Id. at 552; Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 534, 539, 543.
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share the same troubling deficiency.28 4 Once the constitutional
line is crossed, courts treat all violations as being of equal mo-
ment, and thus deserving of the same remedy, distorting the re-
lationship of right and remedy. Instead, in assessing speedy
appeals questions, courts should weigh the severity of the viola-
tion and craft a remedy suited to its extent and nature.28 5 To
do this, the federal courts must make full use of their flexible
powers under the habeas corpus statute and create a sliding
scale of remedies.
Federal court power under the habeas corpus statutes is far
more flexible and, hence, more conducive to a sliding scale of
relief than is commonly recognized by the judiciary. Section
2243 of the Judicial Code requires the federal courts to "dispose
of [habeas corpus petitions] ... as law and justice require. '28 6
The Supreme Court early recognized that this language con-
ferred judicial authority of the "most comprehensive charac-
ter," which is "impossible to widen."287 Until the late 1960s,
federal courts held the view that the requirement that a peti-
tion for habeas corpus be entertained only on behalf of an indi-
vidual in custody288 limited their consideration to questions
that, if determined in the prisoner's favor, would lead to release
from custody.289 In 1968, however, the Supreme Court over-
284. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 534-37 (discussing this problem in the
context of speedy trial jurisprudence).
285. Courts already make judgments regarding the differing severity of the
speedy appeal violations when framing conditional orders of release. After
finding a constitutional violation, the courts proportion the length of time
given the states in which to hear the prisoner's appeal according to what they
perceive to be the severity of that violation. See supra note 227.
286. 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982).
287. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1867). Historically, federal
courts confined the relief available in habeas corpus proceedings to uncondi-
tional discharge from custody. If the legal error shown by the petitioner did
not render his custody at that moment illegal, no remedy was available; if the
error did render his custody illegal, the courts assumed that they lacked the
ability to order a retrial and had no choice but to order the prisoner released
unconditionally.
This rigid position began to erode by the end of the nineteenth century.
For example, in In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 261 (1894), the Court recognized
conditional orders delaying the release of successful habeas petitioners in or-
der to give the state the time to remedy the constitutional violation. In so do-
ing, the Court found that the habeas corpus statute vested federal courts "with
the largest power to control and direct the form of judgment to be entered in
cases brought up before it on habeas corpus." IR. at 261.
288. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982) (defining writ as extending only to prisoners in
custody).
289. See, e.g., McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1934), overruled by, Pey-
ton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968).
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ruled this line of authority in a pair of cases that stressed the
flexible nature of the habeas remedy and the fact that the
habeas statute, both historically and as revised in 1966, contem-
plated a range of relief other than physical discharge from
custody.290
These decisions stress that federal courts possess broad eq-
uitable jurisdiction when entertaining a habeas corpus petition.
As part of that jurisdiction, federal courts may fashion
whatever remedy affecting the terms of custody is necessary to
remedy the constitutional violation.291 Following this broad
mandate, courts have entered orders modifying the terms,
length, or conditions of confinement.292 In addition, courts
have entered declaratory judgments, injunctions affecting pro-
cedures for awarding good time credits or parole,293 orders re-
quiring specific performance of a plea bargain,294 withdrawal of
a guilty plea,2 95 and expunging of criminal records.296 Indeed,
in one recent case,2 97 the Supreme Court suggested, albeit in
dicta, that federal courts have the power directly to alter state
290. In Peyton v. Rowe, the Court held that a prisoner serving consecutive
sentences could challenge the second while still serving the first. 391 U.S. at
67. In the Peyton opinion, the Court reminded the judiciary that "the [habeas]
statute does not deny the federal courts power to fashion appropriate relief
other than immediate release." I& at 66. Similarly, in Carafas v. LaVallee, 391
U.S. 234 (1968) (overruling Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960)), the Supreme
Court found that the collateral consequences of a conviction were sufficient to
justify continuing federal jurisdiction over a petition for habeas corpus even
after the petitioner had served his sentence in full. Id at 237-40. The Court
explained that the habeas statute does not limit the relief that may be granted
to discharge of the applicant from physical custody, remarking that the "1966
amendments to the habeas corpus statute seem specifically to contemplate the
possibility of relief other than immediate release from physical custody" be-
cause the new § 2244(b) speaks in terms of "'release from custody or other
remedy.'" Id. at 239 (citing amended statute).
291. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
292. See generally 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 225, § 8.5, at 113-14 (citing ex-
amples); D. WILKES, supra note 134, § 5-8, at 85-86 (same).
293. See, e.g., Dennis v. Solem, 690 F.2d 145, 146-47 (8th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (permitting state parole board to remedy its noncompliance with sen-
tencing procedures); Welsh v. Mizell, 668 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1982) (remand-
ing to prison review board for a determination of parole application); Horton v.
Irving, 553 F. Supp. 213, 219 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (remanding to prisoner review
board for new parole hearing in compliance with due process requirements).
294. See, e.g., Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (remanding for prisoner resentencing following plea bargained psychi-
atric examination).
295. See, e.g., Grant v. Wisconsin, 450 F. Supp. 575, 579 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
296. Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 1972).
297. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 274 n.21 (1980).
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court judgments rather than relying on injunctions or condi-
tional orders of release to effect the desired relief.
Given this background, federal courts should face few diffi-
culties in creating a sliding scale of relief for speedy appeal vio-
lations. For example, if a petitioner demonstrates
constitutionally impermissible delay but can neither show prej-
udice nor egregiously long delay, the court may simply, as now,
order that the petitioner be released if the state does not hear
the appeal within a brief period. Although this remedy entails
all the difficulties of the conditional writ discussed earlier 298
and creates no particular incentive for the states to remedy sys-
temic problems of delay, it may be an adequate remedy in the
least severe cases of appellate delay.
If the jurisdiction has a pattern of appellate delay or if the
constitutional violation is more severe, however, the courts
should release the defendant on bail pending resolution of his
appeal.299 This approach has several virtues. First, it elimi-
nates any prejudice accruing to the defendant from incarcera-
tion during the grace period that accompanies a conditional
298. See supra Part III. A. 1.
299. If the federal court orders the state to release a habeas corpus peti-
tioner unless the state retries him within a specific period of time, the district
court may admit the petitioner to bail pending the retrial. United States ex
reL Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 743 (3d Cir.) (dicta) (reasoning that
release on bail is proper when the district court order of release is conditioned
on a new trial but the "district court concludes that enlargement is proper"),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973). The district court's power to admit a state
habeas petitioner to bail "derives from the power to issue the writ itself." Ma-
rino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 507 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); cf FED. R.
APP. P. 23(b) & (c) (concerning bail pending habeas corpus appeals).
Because the state exhaustion requirement entails a thorough review of a
prisoner's claims prior to bringing a federal habeas corpus action, most peti-
tioners are considered unlikely to prevail on retrial and therefore present a
poor risk for bail. See, e.g., Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 772-79 (1987).
Federal habeas courts rarely use the power to grant bail, e.g., Cherek v. United
States, 767 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1985) (arguing that federal courts must use
this power sparingly), despite authority to the effect that the petitioner, being
in possession of a final order that his custody violates federal law, reverts to a
position very much like a pretrial detainee. 2 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 225,
§ 31.4, at 496. A recent district court case has, in fact, shown the courts willing
to be somewhat more adventuresome in using their unquestioned power to ad-
mit petitioners to bail in the speedy appeal context. In the consolidated peti-
tions of Jacob v. Henderson, No. 86 Civ. 3450, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
1989) (LEXIS 14137, Genfed library, Dist file), and Thomas v. Harris, No. 86
Civ. 4214, slip op. at 2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1987) (LEXIS 14137, Genfed library,
Dist file), the district court granted the prisoners release on bail pending reso-
lution of their appeals if the appeals were not decided within approximately
three months. The court also did not preclude further relief should the delays
continue beyond the three months. Id. at 5-6.
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grant of release. Second, it removes any federal court complic-
ity in an ongoing constitutional violation. Third, it induces the
state courts to hear appeals promptly during the pendency of
habeas corpus proceedings rather than waiting until the district
court issues a conditional order, thereby limiting the number
and degree of delayed appeals. Finally, it enables the court to
compensate the petitioner for the effects of a lengthy delay that
has not prejudiced him apart from incarceration.30 0
Courts may object to the setting of bail on the ground that
it would eliminate any incentives for the appellant or his attor-
ney to speed the appeal along. Instead, courts might argue the
best approach for appellate counsel representing a client re-
leased on bail pending appeal would be to stall proceedings for
as long as possible. This danger is more apparent than real.
Courts can always revoke the appellant's bond if such abuses
take place. Moreover, states could avoid the problem alto-
gether by expediting the appeal during the pendency of the
habeas action. Even after federal relief is ordered, if the state
courts were to enforce their appellate briefing schedules with
the same alacrity as the federal courts, defense attorneys could
not delay cases, particularly if government attorneys also acted
with appropriate diligence.
If a defendant establishes a more serious claim of appellate
delay, including an egregiously long delay, a pattern of severe
and unremedied delay in a jurisdiction, or prosecutorial bad
faith, the courts should fashion a more drastic remedy. For ex-
ample, the courts may reduce the defendant's sentence by a fac-
tor proportional to the length of the delay or the severity of the
violation. Such relief could take the form either of a reduction
in the prisoner's maximum sentence, rendering the prisoner el-
igible for parole and other benefits at an earlier date than
under his original sentence, or of a reduction in his minimum
sentence, rendering the prisoner eligible for release at an ear-
lier date but not affecting his maximum term.
300. It must be admitted that the incentives to flight are considerably en-
hanced after a guilty verdict even if the petitioner seeks to contest that verdict
on appeal. This is reflected in the relative difficulty of securing bail pending
appeal in the first instance. On the other hand, the community takes the risk
inherent in the outright release of those adjudicated guilty at trial in the ser-
vice of a variety of other constitutional values, such as the fourth amendment
right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure or the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial. E.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 (1973)
(determining that dismissal remains the "only possible remedy" for depriva-
tion of the right to speedy trial).
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Of all the suggested uses of the remedial powers of habeas
corpus, relief in the form of sentence reduction presents the
greatest difficulty. In general, federal habeas corpus relief
modifying sentences is aimed at granting the petitioner the sen-
tence he would have received absent the constitutional viola-
tion.3 01 For example, in the death penalty context, federal
courts have ordered conditional relief commuting the peti-
tioner's sentence to life imprisonment without parole unless
the state retried the penalty phase of the capital trial.302 Ex-
tending this reasoning somewhat, as a remedy for what it found
to be a state's invalid sentencing procedure, a federal court has
ordered a prisoner released after serving the minimum possible
sentence for his offense unless the state resentenced him under
procedures that complied with the eighth amendment.3 03
None of these cases, however, show courts reducing a sen-
tence in a way not contemplated by the proper application of
state law. On the other hand, it is clear that the courts have
not yet "defined the precise contours" of what is meant by their
power to dispose of habeas petitions as "law and justice re-
quire. °3 0 4 Moreover, there appears to be no clear reason why
federal courts cannot reduce the sentence of a petitioner whose
rights have been violated by appellate delay. Relying on the
principle that the greater power includes the lesser, the power
to release altogether, the fundamental power under federal
habeas corpus, ought to include the power to reduce the peti-
tioner's sentence. Indeed, following the pattern of the condi-
tional order of release, the federal court might even consider
framing its order reducing the petitioner's sentences as a
delayed order of release.30 5
In the most serious cases of appellate delay, as when a peti-
tioner has cast doubt on his ability to receive an unimpaired ap-
peal or when the delay in the individual case is outrageous and
301. See, e.g., Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 21 n.3 (1981) (per curiam).
302. E.g., Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 392 (1986); Collins v. Lockhart,
754 F.2d 256, 268 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1013 (1985).
303. Britton v. Rogers, 476 F. Supp. 1036, 1043 (E.D. Ark. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980).
304. 1 J. LIEBMAN, supra note 225, § 8.5, at 114.
305. Traditionally, federal courts have been reluctant to issue orders di-
rectly modifying state sentences, preferring instead to work through condi-
tional orders of release and other procedural devices. Supreme Court dicta,
however, suggests that the federal courts have the power to alter state court
judgments directly. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 274 n.21 (1981). In any
event, framing the order as one granting delayed release of the prisoner ap-
pears to circumvent this difficulty altogether.
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the state has proven unvilling to remedy a longstanding pat-
tern of delays, the courts should not hesitate to order a prisoner
discharged from custody.30 6 This is a particularly important
point because the institutional aspect of appellate delay has
proven intractable to the ordinary judicial remedies.30 7 The
more obvious avenues of judicial intervention and change, such
as class actions for injunctive relief, fail to reach state appellate
delays because of the bar against ongoing federal supervision of
a state criminal justice system.308 Moreover, because habeas
corpus petitions must be brought on behalf of an individual pe-
titioner, systemic abuses rarely figure in the federal court's de-
liberations except when considering the habeas requirement of
exhaustion of state remedies.30 9
Under these circumstances, discharge is a proper remedy
for the most serious cases of appellate delay.310 Discharge is
306. Cf. Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1222 (3d Cir. 1987) (specify-
ing egregious conditions warranting discharge); see Rivera v. Concepcion, 469
F.2d 17, 19-20 (1972) (denying motion to stay order granting bail); supra notes
243-46 and accompanying text (discussing Burkett); see also supra note 203.
307. E.g., Mathis v. Hood, 851 F.2d 612, 615 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that even
if state remedy existed, circumstances rendered state corrective process inef-
fective); see also contemporaneous cases arising from state courts' inability to
monitor appointed counsel, such as Brooks v. Jones, 875 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir.
1989); Claytor v. Hoke, No. 87 Civ. 2918, slip op. at 9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1987)
(LEXIS 12385, Genfed library, Dist file) (noting that the state was responsible
for the breakdown in the appellate system); Jacob v. Henderson, No. 86 Civ.
3450, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1987) (LEXIS 14137, Genfed library, Dist
file) (noting failure of appellate division to monitor unperfected appeals and
take effective action in delays) and Thomas v. Harris, No. 86 Civ. 4214, slip op.
at 5-6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1987) (LEXIS 14137, Genfed library, Dist file) (same);
Wheeler v. Kelly, 639 F. Supp. 1374, 1376-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting the "stag-
gering" volume of pending unperfected appeals in the appellate division). Cf.
Chapper & Hanson, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that "[t]he general pattern of
appellate reform is, however, uneven. Many courts have considered making
changes, often at length, but have not acted on any proposal. Other courts
enter into experiments which never become institutionalized.").
308. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
310. Finally, federal courts may face cases in which the defendant has
served his entire sentence before the state courts decide his appeal. In such
cases, the usual forms of habeas relief are inadequate because the defendant
no longer is in custody. Although the courts may continue to entertain the
habeas petition under the rule of Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239-40
(1968), the relief affecting custody is a moot point. In such situations, particu-
larly when the appeal appears to have been colorable, the courts should con-
sider vacating the defendant's criminal conviction or even expunging the
defendant's criminal record altogether. Such relief clearly is within the
court's power, see, e.g., Bromley v. Crisp, 561 F.2d 1351, 1363-64 (10th Cir.
1977), Bentley v. Florida, 285 F. Supp. 494, 498 (S.D. Fla. 1968), and may well
be necessary to vindicate the constitutional values at issue. Courts also may
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apt to serve as a prophylactic against further state appellate de-
lays. Moreover, the interests of judicial economy and, in the fi-
nal analysis, of federalism and comity, are advanced if the
federal courts are not pressed over and over to consider the
problems of state appellate delay and to intervene in state court
process. Repeated claims of delay and repeated conditional
grants of release, no less than injunctive relief, constitute intru-
sive and ongoing supervision of a state court system.
CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR STATE SPEEDY
APPEAL ACTS
The remedies just outlined, although providing a fairer and
more consistent pattern of relief for violations of the right to a
speedy appeal than now exists, still present serious deficiencies.
Availability of these remedies is likely to yield a further in-
crease in federal habeas corpus petitions, increasing the burden
both on the states, which must defend against these petitions,
and on the federal courts, which must hear them. Moreover,
such an ad hoc approach leads to rough justice at best; the bal-
ancing test is necessarily inexact, the fit between rights and
remedies even more so. States may be forced to hear and re-
solve appeals on the basis of length of delay, not probable
merit. Moreover, on the principle that the squeaky wheel is
greased first, the right to a speedy appeal may turn into the
right - after delay has reached constitutional proportions - to
have a federal court issue an order granting discharge from cus-
tody if the appeal is not heard within a specified time.
These implications are not attractive. This Article began
with a discussion of the speedy trial experience of the 1960s and
1970s. That experience demonstrated that constitutional litiga-
tion is an ineffective tool to vindicate an unquestioned right;311
this Article has shown that the same is true of the right to a
speedy appeal. Constitutional litigation, with serious teeth in it,
consider declaratory relief. See, e.g., Mizell v. Attorney General, 586 F.2d 942,
948 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting possibility of declaratory relief). Similarly, if a pris-
oner has been paroled prior to the resolution of his appeal, the court either
may order his immediate release from the terms of parole or, in cases more
closely resembling that of the defendant who has served his entire sentence
prior to the resolution of his appeal, the court may vacate the defendant's con-
viction. Any other approach will leave some of the most patently offensive vi-
olations of the right to a speedy appeal without any meaningful remedy.
311. See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 526 (concluding that sixth amend-
ment doctrines and enforcement procedures do not protect defendants' inter-
ests against undue delay).
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however, is a necessary tool to inform the public debate and to
spur states to action.
Although a detailed discussion of speedy appeals legislation
is beyond the scope of this Article, it is clear that a speedy ap-
peal act specifying a set time line for briefing and hearing an
appeal would effect a marked improvement. Modeled on
speedy trial acts, such legislation would inject some certainty
into amorphous standards. Federal courts no longer would face
the difficult task of balancing a variety of intangible factors to
ascertain where delay leaves off and constitutional violation be-
gins. Rather, state courts would implement legislatively deter-
mined timetables for calculating impermissible delay with
clearly defined remedies attached. Federal courts would
merely ensure that state courts followed their own laws and
that these laws met constitutional standards - a much simpler
task. Speedy appeals legislation would firmly demonstrate the
states' commitment to the values of speedy justice for all. For
although it is axiomatic that states are not constitutionally re-
quired to grant the right to a criminal appeal, it is even more
fundamentally true that justice delayed is justice denied.
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